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ARTICLES
INVIDIOUS DELIBERATION: THE PROBLEM OF




Through the enactment of federal hate crime laws, Congress
decides which groups are most vulnerable to bias motivated-
violence, and which groups are worthy of statutory protection
against such crimes. This Article contends that such congressional
decisions-specifically the selection of which groups are entitled to
protection under federal hate crime legislation-discriminate
against the very groups that are most vulnerable to bias.
This Article analyzes evidence of bias in over two decades of
congressional deliberations concerning the Hate Crime Statistics
Act (the HCSA), which functions as a "gateway" for groups seeking
protection under federal hate crime legislation. The Article reviews
congressional decisions relating to eight groups: the seven currently
covered groups-race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation,
disability, gender, and gender identity-and the only candidate
group to receive a congressional hearing that has not yet been
admitted to the HCSA: the homeless. The review observes that
Congress exhibited greater resistance to constructing animus
against gays, lesbians, and the homeless as morally or legally
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wrong, especially in comparison to the other covered groups. This
congressional resistance is not attributable to an equitable,
principled deliberation process; instead, it is an expression of
Congress's own "unrecognized" bias against unpopular groups. As a
result, congressional bias may exclude the most vulnerable groups
from hate crime protection.
To address this problem, Congress should explicitly and
consistently use a set of principled criteria in its assessments of
HCSA candidate groups. This Article proposes certain suspect
classification factors as one example of such criteria. If Congress
used such principled criteria, it could mitigate the ironic presence of
congressional bias in anti-bias legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
[The] equal protection doctrine does not prevent the majority from
enacting laws based on its substantive value choices. Equal




The legislature "makes a normative statement when it frames its
bias crime statute-there is no such thing as a 'neutral' bias crime
law."2
As a human enterprise, the legislative process is not immune to
the distinctly human pathology of bias. Indeed, political power and
social popularity have unsurprising influences on the shape of
statutory law. But Equal Protection principles-as well as a basic
sense of fairness and decency-compel the rejection of invidious
discrimination,3 that is, evidence that a law treats similarly situated
groups unequally and without a principled justification,4 resulting in
a diminished or degraded moral status for the target.5
This Article identifies a problem with bias in congressional
deliberations at a particularly critical point: when Congress decides
which groups to protect under federal hate crime legislation. This
Article systematically reviews two decades of congressional decisions
with respect to expansions of the Hate Crime Statistics Act
("HCSA"), which functions as a critical "gateway" for groups seeking
1. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 720 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
2. FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN
LAW 17 (1999).
3. "Invidious discrimination" is a classification which is "arbitrary, irrational, and
not reasonably related to a legitimate purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 826 (6th ed.
1990); see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing that application
of "strict scrutiny" may be necessary to eliminate the risk of a state invidiously
discriminating "against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional
guaranty of just and equal laws").
4. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(noting that judicial intervention in the form of strict scrutiny is appropriate when a
law "reflect[s] prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not
as worthy or deserving as others"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that
treating similarly situated classes differently without a normative justification
amounts to the "very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
[Constitution]"); cf J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994)
(concluding that legislative discrimination violates the Fourteenth Amendment when
it "serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes");
Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724 (sanctioning some forms of "discrimination ... against some
groups because the animus is warranted-[for example,] no one could seriously argue
that burglars form a suspect class"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 154 (1980) (similarly justifying discrimination against
burglars).
5. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (discussing how
discriminatory legislation relegates the target group to an "inferior legal status"). The
use of the word "target" in this manner can be attributed to Jennifer Earl & Sarah
Soule, The Differential Protection of Minority Groups: The Inclusion of Sexual
Orientation, Gender, and Disability in State Hate Crime Laws, 1976-1995, in THE
POLITICS OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY 3 (Betty A. Dobratz et al. eds., 2001).
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protection from bias-motivated violence.6 This review concludes that
these congressional choices tend to discriminate against the very
groups that are most vulnerable to bias.
This Article argues that these legislative deliberations are
compromised by the presence of latent or "unrecognized" bias. For
hate crime purposes, animus toward a particular group only registers
as bias7 if that animus is a "recognizable social pathology."s Put
another way, animus against a group is only construed as "wrong" if
society believes the group is undeserving of animus.9 For example,
animus directed at a certain group based solely on the group
members' negative or damaging behavior, such as criminal action, is
more likely to be normatively construed as acceptable because the
behavior is perceived to justify the animus.1o Such "justified" animus
6. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012)).
7. Through the HCSA, the federal government ultimately tasked the Uniform
Crime Reporting ("UCR") Program with the job of establishing the necessary
guidelines and procedures for collecting hate crime data. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO.
SERV. DIv., FBI, HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES AND TRAINING MANUAL 1-
2 (2012) [hereinafter HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION MANUAL], available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/data-collection-manual. The UCR guidelines define
a hate crime as "[a] committed criminal offense that is motivated, in whole or in part,
by the offender's bias(es)." Id. at 8. The guidelines also define bias as "[a] preformed
negative opinion or attitude toward a group of persons based on their race, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity." Id.
8. LAWRENCE, supra note 2, at 11 (arguing that in order to qualify as a bias crime,
the "antipathy [animating the offense] must exist in a social context, that is, it must be
an animus that is shared by others in the culture and that is a recognizable social
pathology within the culture"). My use of the phrase "unrecognized bias" also channels
Grattet and Jenness's discussion of how the passage of time and narrative
normalization "reflects the relative newness of [a candidate group] as a recognizable
axis of discrimination." Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, Criminology: Examining the
Boundaries of Hate Crime Law: Disabilities and the "Dilemma of Difference", 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 668-69 (2001) [hereinafter Grattet & Jenness,
Criminology] (discussing the evolved perception and recognition of discrimination
against the disabled); see id. at 671-73 (discussing similar evolutions with respect to
gender, disability, and sexual orientation, which "have only recently been recognized
by policymakers responsible for the formulation of hate crime law as legitimate axes
around which hate crime occurs"). In some respects, the phrase "recognizable social
pathology" also invites comparisons to "unconscious bias." Unconscious bias refers to
when people "fail to perceive the factors that cause them to exhibit . . . preferences."
Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Unconscious Racism: A Concept in Pursuit of a
Measure, 34 ANN. REV. Soc. 277, 279 (2008). It also "refers to individuals' lack of
awareness of the effects of their own actions on other people, social institutions, and so
on." Id. For an interesting discussion on the construction of "unconscious" prejudice in
the Equal Protection context, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
9. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 4, at 154 (reviewing situations where animus against
certain groups may be perceived as warranted).
10. See, e.g., Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724 (sanctioning some forms of "discrimination.
against some groups because the animus is warranted-[for example,] no one could
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is generally not recognized as a bias in the legal or moral sense. Of
course, American society-including its proxy in Congress-still
suffers from a range of unrecognized social pathologies of which it is
not consciously aware or which it does not wish to recognize. When
Congress is in a position to determine whether a certain group is
subject to bias, as it is when it assesses candidate groups for coverage
under federal hate crime laws, Congress may not even recognize its
own bias against certain candidate groups as a "social pathology"
warranting statutory redress.11 Indeed, the problem of unrecognized
bias becomes especially pressing with respect to the HCSA: it is the
gateway to federal, uniform data that might corroborate a group's
special vulnerability to bias-based violence and clarify any need for
further statutory protection.
If Congress used a principled set of criteria to assess HCSA
candidate groups, it would encourage greater consistency, equity, and
accountability in its decision-making process. Congressional
deliberations would become more transparent and predictable, and
the public could more readily hold Congress accountable for
unsupported deviations from these principles. Consistent use of these
principles would bring greater coherence and credibility to the
legislative decision-making process. A principled congressional
narrative would improve both the legislative and public
understanding of the law. Ultimately, this consistent application of
principled criteria may mitigate the potential for legislative bias in
future expansions of the HCSA.
This Article tests the principled quality of congressional
decision-making with respect to expansions of the HCSA. Part I
provides a brief overview of the HCSA, including its purpose and
current group coverage. Part II takes a closer look at congressional
decisions to add or exclude each candidate group, including race,
religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, gender, gender
identity, and homelessness. This examination reveals that Congress
does not consistently or equitably assess candidate groups; instead,
congressional decisions may be influenced by "unrecognized bias"
against less popular groups, such as the LGBTQ community and the
homeless. Part III explains why the combined lack of principles and
the influence of unrecognized bias are inherently problematic in
legislative constructions of hate crime laws. Part IV urges Congress
to address this problem by consistently and transparently applying a
seriously argue that burglars form a suspect class").
11. "Indeed . . . the act of identifying a problem is as much a normative judgment
as it is an objective statement of fact; thus, if analysis proceeds from the identification
of a problem, and the problem is defined normatively, then one cannot say that any
subsequent analysis is strictly neutral." THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE POLICY PROCESS: THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND MODELS OF PUBLIC POLICY MAKING
15 (3d ed. 2011).
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set of criteria in its assessments of HCSA candidate groups. This
section also proposes certain suspect classification factors as one way
Congress could improve the principled quality of its deliberations
over expansions of the HCSA. Ultimately, this Article seeks
correction of the ironic presence of congressional bias in anti-bias
legislation.
I. THE HATE CRIME STATISTICS ACT: A LENS TO DETECT BIAS
As a diagnostic tool, the HCSA is a critical first step to federal
recognition of a group's vulnerability to bias-motivated violence. The
HCSA mandates the collection of statistical data on bias crimes
committed against specifically enumerated groups. 12 This statistical
data can help to determine whether a group is significantly
victimized and to identify trends in the types of bias crimes
occurring; trends relating to the perpetrators of such violence; and
other information to support the public, law enforcement, and
community service agencies in preventing and addressing such
violence.13
As a gateway to further federal hate crime protection, the HCSA
also provides a helpful lens to detect congressional attitudes and
perceptions relating to bias. As demonstrated below, legislative
deliberations over which groups to include under the HCSA help to
reveal congressional dispositions to either recognize animus toward a
particular group as bias or to construe such animus as acceptable.14
Although some of this Article's observations could apply across
federal hate crime statutes, there are several reasons to narrow the
scope to the HCSA. First, the HCSA can serve as a diagnostic tool,
implemented before the passage of other statutory measures. In
other words, the HCSA is a logical starting place to determine the
need for or scope of other hate crime statutes. Second, the HCSA is
defensible on its own terms and without reference to other hate crime
laws; as a diagnostic resource, the HCSA simply provides
information. As opposed to other federal hate crime laws-such as
those that provide for aggravated sentencing, budgetary allocations,
or other preventative or remedial measures-the HCSA does not
mandate or recommend any particular response to the information
collected. Instead, the data is available to educate the public, law
12. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §534 (2012)).
13. J. M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crime into Focus - The Hate Crime Statistics
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 26 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (1991)
(discussing the legislative intent behind the HCSA).
14. Thus, legislative history can provide direct evidence of congressional attitudes
toward HCSA candidate groups. See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 909 (2012) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
treatment of legislative history as "direct evidence" of legislative animus).
568 [Vol. 66:3
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enforcement, and community service providers so each can better
understand, coordinate, and respond more effectively to violence
against vulnerable groups. 15 Because of these features, the HCSA
should not provoke the broad range of criticism and debate directed
to other federal hate crime statutes.
Certainly, some critiques firmly reject the purpose and efficacy of
any hate crime legislation. For example, some dispute the premise
that the law should punish bias crimes differently than "ordinary"
crimes.' 6 Others pose moral, ethical, economical, and practical
challenges to hate crime laws generally.17 But critiques that dispute
15. See Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 661-62.
16. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2004) (arguing that no scholarship through 2004 demonstrates
"an adequate moral justification or an acceptable doctrinal framework" for hate crime
legislation); Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical
Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1015 (1997) (assessing
justifications for bias crime statutes and concluding that such justifications rest on
unsettled ground); Michael McGough, Op-Ed., The Kansas Killings: Will Every Crime
Be a Hate Crime Someday?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014, 12:58 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-hatecrime-kansas-antisemitism-
20140415-story.html#axzz2zLBPomnh (identifying "the perplexities that surround
hate-crime laws," including the argument that "hate-crime laws may have the
paradoxical effect of privileging some victims of violence over others"). Other scholars
maintain that hate crimes not only divert attention away from the root causes and
consequences of bias and prejudice, but also point out a "dilemma of difference"
inherent in federal hate crime legislation. The phrase "dilemma of difference," which
describes how the stigma of difference may be created both by ignoring and
acknowledging it, is from MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw 20-23 (Cornell U. Press, 1991). For related critiques,
see generally Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8 (discussing Minow's
"dilemma of difference" in application to hate crime legislation); Jane Spade & Craig
Willse, Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism: A Radical Critique, 21
CHICANO-LATINo L. REV. 38, 39 (2000) (interrogating the legal categorization of queer
and transgender people as "a practice of 'identity politics' that, despite accomplishing
certain goals, nonetheless dangerously reifies constructs of homosexual identity");
Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1242 (1991) ("The embrace of
identity politics, however, has been in tension with dominant conceptions of social
justice."). Legal scholarship is replete with other critiques that pose a broader range of
moral, ethical, economical, and practical concerns. LAWRENCE, supra note 2, at 45-63
(discussing arguments for why hate crimes should be punished differently).
17. See, e.g., Susan B. Gellman & Frederick M. Lawrence, Agreeing to Agree: A
Proponent and Opponent of Hate Crime Laws Reach for Common Ground, 41 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 421, 422-33 (2004) (outlining arguments for and against hate crime laws);
Jeannine Bell, Policing Hatred: Police Bias Units and The Construction of Hate Crime,
2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421, 448-60 (1997) (critiquing the impact of "broad" police
discretion in enforcing hate crime laws); Christopher Chorba, The Danger of
Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional Misconceptions and the Unintended
Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 319, 321, 344-60 (2001)
(arguing that federal hate crime legislation is unnecessary and that the Prevention Act
would "have a disparate effect on racial minorities" because the statutory language
may be read to include interracial crime); Jordan Blair Woods, Addressing Youth Bias
570 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:3
the propriety of any federal hate crime law can be set aside here:
Congress has already decided that a federal scheme is appropriate.
Moreover, such general detractions can be distinguished from the
specific critiques of the HCSA that are addressed in this article.18
The specific focus of this Article is how Congress selects certain
groups to cover under the HCSA.
A. A First Glance at Group Coverage
The HCSA was the first federal statute to mandate the national,
uniform reporting of hate crimes. 19 At the time of its passage in 1990,
the HCSA required the FBI to collect data on bias crimes motivated
by race, religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.20 Currently, the
HCSA requires the FBI to collect data from law enforcement agencies
on crimes that evidence prejudice based upon race, religion,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, gender, or gender identity.21
Congressional decisions as to which groups to include or exclude
under the HCSA have evolved over time.22 The first bills, proposed in
1985, focused exclusively on race, religion, and ethnicity;23 sexual
orientation was first added in 1987,24 shortly before the enactment of
Crime, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1899, 1903-05, 1908-14, 1923-34 (2009) (rejecting the
aggravated sentencing provisions of the Sentencing Act and advocating for
rehabilitation for youth bias crime offenders); David Goldberger, The Inherent
Unfairness of Hate Crime Statutes, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 449, 449 (2004) (criticizing
hate crime sentencing enhancement statutes "for granting prosecutors inordinate
power over plea bargaining and sentencing"). But see LAWRENCE, supra note 2, at 45-
63 (discussing arguments for why hate crimes should be punished differently).
18. General objections to federal hate crime legislation, including the Prevention
Act, often relate to federalism concerns and First Amendment rights. Although these
are persistent objections, they have repeatedly been resolved in favor of such
legislation. See, e.g., David Hong, Hate Crime Regulation and Challenges, 10 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 279, 287-94 (2009) (discussing First Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, and Commerce Clause challenges); Gellman & Lawrence, supra note 17,
at 426-38 (discussing First Amendment concerns); Murad Kalam, Hate Crime
Prevention, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 593, 593-94 (2000) (reviewing federalism and First
Amendment concerns). This Article addresses these general objections only when they
intersect with evidence of congressional resistance to the addition of specific groups.
19. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012)).
20. Id.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012).
22. Overviews of the general development of federal hate crime legislation can be
found elsewhere. See, e.g., Valerie Jenness, Managing Differences and Making
Legislation: Social Movements and the Racialization, Sexualization, and Gendering of
Federal Hate Crime Law in the U.S., 1985-1988, 46 Soc. PROBS. 548, 551-52 (1999);
LAWRENCE, supra note 2, 9-28; Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 661-
66.
23. Hate Crime Statistics Act, H.R. 2455, 99th Cong. (1985).
24. Hate Crime Statistics Act, H.R. 3193, 100th Cong. (1987).
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the HCSA in 1990.25
Then in 1994, Congress added disability and gender to the scope
of federal hate crime laws. That year, Congress specifically modified
the HCSA to collect data for bias crimes against the disabled.26
Gender was not immediately incorporated into the HCSA; instead,
that same year, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA"), the first federal hate crime law to focus specifically on
gender.27 Also in 1994, Congress passed a new Hate Crimes
Sentencing Enhancement Act (Sentencing Act), which provided
aggravated sentencing guidelines for bias crimes committed against
specifically enumerated groups; the list included the groups that
were included in the HCSA but added gender.28 However, these 1994
developments fell short of modifying the HCSA to mandate the
collection of data on crimes motivated by gender.
Finally, in 2009, Congress broadened federal hate crime
legislation again, adding gender and gender identity as protected
groups under the HCSA and the Sentencing Act through the passage
of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act ("Prevention Act").29 The
Prevention Act was the first federal statute to offer protection to
transgender people.3o It was also the first piece of hate crime
legislation to remove the federal jurisdiction requirement, so victims
of hate crime no longer had to be engaged in a federally-protected
activity in order to justify federal intervention.31 The Prevention Act
clarified the federal mandate to collect data on crimes motivated by
25. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534
(2012)).
26. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 320926, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
27. The Violence Against Women Act specifies that "[a]ll persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender."
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, § 40302(b) (1994),
invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
28. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 280003(a), 108 Stat. 2096 (1994). For purposes of the Sentencing Act, a hate
crime is defined as criminal conduct wherein "the defendant intentionally selects a
victim, or in the case of a property crime, the property that is the object of the crime,
because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person." Id.
29. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 4701-4713, 123
Stat. 2835 (2009). For ease, this statute and all of its closely related predecessors are
hereinafter referred to as the Prevention Act in text; citations will specify any title
variations.
30. See lona M. Turner, Pioneering Strategies to Win Trans Rights in California,
34 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 5, 12 (2012).
31. Lisa Kye Young Kim, The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Act: The Interplay of the Judiciary and Congress in Suspect Classification Analysis, 12
Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 495, 496-97 (2011).
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gender and gender identity.32
Legislative history occasionally mentions other potential HCSA
candidate groups, such as children, the elderly, police officers, and
union members. However, these proposals were not made by outside
stakeholders; instead, congressional opponents of federal hate crime
laws proposed such alternatives as straw man arguments to obstruct
passage of the legislation.33 Relatedly, these candidate groups "did
not attract significant, sustained advocacy and social movement
mobilization."34 Without a significant outside lobby for the inclusion
of these groups under the HCSA, Congress never held hearings to
examine their vulnerability to bias-motivated violence.35 Since 2007,
only one group with significant outside support and congressional
sponsorship has received a hearing but so far has been unsuccessful
in securing coverage under the HCSA: the homeless.
B. A Closer Look at Congressional Decision-Making With Respect
to Group Coverage
The evolution of groups covered under the HCSA proves that
Congress exercises some discrimination in the selection of covered
groups; the key question is whether Congress is at risk of invidious
discrimination in its deliberative process. How has Congress chosen
some groups for coverage under the HCSA and resisted the addition
of others?
As reviewed below, legislative history reveals inconsistencies in
the depth and scope of congressional inquiry and debate. In 1990,
Congress decided to cover race, religion, and ethnicity with virtually
32. Apparently, the FBI did not begin incorporating this data into its published
uniform statistics until after 2010. Compare FBI, HATE CRIME STATISTICS 2010,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/resources/hate-crime-
2010-about-ucr (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) ("The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.
Hate Crime Prevention Act of 2009 requires the collection of data on crimes motivated
by 'gender and gender identity' bias . . . . The national UCR Program staff is
developing collection strategies to meet both of these most recent mandates."), with
HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION MANUAL supra note 7, at 2 ("As a result [of the
Prevention Act], the FBI UCR Program now captures statistics on hate crimes based
on gender and gender identity prejudices .... .").
33. For example, in the course of congressional debates over the HCSA, dissenting
Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), who consistently voted against federal hate crime
legislation, proposed an amendment to add labor unions to Senate bill 702. See S. Rep.
No. 100-514 at 5 (1988). The lack of a legitimate effort or process to consider bias
crimes against union members is also observed in Grattet & Jenness, Criminology,
supra note 8, at 673. Similarly, in the course of debates over the bills that would
ultimately become the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, dissenting conservatives
suggested the inclusion of several alternate groups, including the military, children,
police, the elderly, victims, and witnesses. See, e.g., H.R. REP NO. 110-113 (2007). See
discussion of other poison pill efforts infra notes 146, 241 and accompanying text.




no debate.36 But the proposal to add sexual orientation generated
prolonged and heated congressional argument. Four years later, in
1994, disability was added, again without significant debate. 37
Although gender took a rather circuitous route, ultimately, its 2009
addition to the HCSA was a relatively tame affair. Gender identity,
also added in 2009,38 was a curious case: its proposal re-ignited
debate over sexual orientation, but this debate was sporadic and
comparatively muted. That same year, Congress granted a hearing
on bias crimes affecting the homeless,39 but to this day, Congress has
resisted the addition of the homeless to the HCSA.
Analysis of these congressional decisions also shows that
statistics and other evidence of need for hate crime protection have
played an inconsistent role in a candidate group's bid for coverage
under the HCSA. Certainly, in order for a group to warrant coverage,
Congress must perceive some threshold evidence of that group's
vulnerability to bias crimes. Put another way, a candidate group
cannot receive coverage under the HCSA simply because it askS40 or
because it lacks any supportive statistical data. Instead, a candidate
group should proffer some credible evidence to support the need for
statutory protection.41
But Congress does not consistently require a candidate group to
prove its vulnerability to animus. Instead, congressional vetting of
candidate groups appears to correlate with the relative social
acceptability or popularity42 of the candidate group. As described
below, with respect to race, religion, disability, and gender, Congress
either did not require evidence of vulnerability to bias crimes or
readily accepted whatever evidence was proffered.43 But when
36. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
37. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
38. See Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835
(2009).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 111-86(2009).
40. 134 CONG. REc. S. 11403 (1988) (statement of Sen. George W. Gekas).
41. The credible evidence standard does not demand scientific or empirical purity,
particularly because candidate groups generally lack the resources to collect such data;
hence, their application for coverage under the HCSA. Instead, "[c]laims are
empirically credible 'to the extent that there are events and occurrences that can be
pointed to as documentary evidence."' Jenness, supra note 22, at 556 n.6 (internal
citations omitted).
42. By "relative social acceptability," I am generally referring to a whether a
candidate group is commonly accepted by society as embodying majority values and
identities at the time it was assessed by Congress for coverage under the HCSA. The
concept of social acceptability and popularity also invokes the Supreme Court's
description of animus as a "desire to harm a politically unpopular group." U.S. Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
43. See infra Part II.
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certain "unpopular" candidates-such as homosexualS44 or the
homeless-seek coverage under the HCSA, Congress not only
appears to require evidence of the group's vulnerability to bias
crimes, but also appears to subject such proffered evidence to higher
levels of scrutiny and debate. Significantly, these congressional
choices do not mirror judicial heightened scrutiny analysis under the
Equal Protection Clause;45 nor do they correlate with protections
afforded in contemporaneous federal civil rights legislation.46
The irony of this inconsistency is at least three-fold: first, it
demonstrates the vulnerability of unpopular groups to legislative
discrimination based on their group membership and identity.
Second, these unpopular groups are more likely to lack
44. The juxtaposition of the word "homosexual" with "unpopular" groups is
intentional here; it was the term most commonly used by members of Congress who
objected to the inclusion of sexual orientation in federal hate crime legislation. The
relevant term under the HCSA is "sexual orientation"; however, the term was often
subject to congressional debate and definitional wrangling. See, e.g., infra pp. 576-77,
587-88.
45. Congressional resistance does not simply correlate to the level of judicial
scrutiny applied to suspect classes. If measured by United States Supreme Court
decisions at the time each group was a candidate for addition to the HCSA, the
following levels of judicial scrutiny applied: race and ethnicity (strict scrutiny), see,
e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); sexual orientation (rational basis review),
see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); disability (rational basis), see City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); gender (intermediate scrutiny),
see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); and gender identity (rational basis), see Ulane
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding "[t]he words of Title
VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual identity disorder,
i.e. . . . a person born with a female body who believes herself to be male"), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985). See also Gwen Havlik, Equal Protection for
Transgendered Employees? Analyzing the Court's Call for More Than Rational Basis in
the Glenn v. Brumby Decision, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1315, 1322-24 (2012). If levels of
congressional resistance correlated with levels of judicial review, one would expect
similar levels of resistance demonstrated in deliberations over disability, sexual
orientation, and gender identity because these were all subject to rational basis review
at the time they were assessed for the HCSA; however, as explained infra,
comparisons of congressional dispositions toward these and other candidate groups do
not support such a correlation. Even if congressional decision-making could be argued
to more closely correlate to judicial levels of scrutiny, it should not. The spirit of the
judiciary's use of suspect classification scrutiny is to shield vulnerable groups from
legislative discrimination. This spirit is contravened if Congress uses heightened
scrutiny as a means to deny statutory protection to vulnerable groups. Anti-Gay
Violence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal. Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 8 (1986) [hereinafter Anti-Gay Violence Hearing] (statement of
Rep. Barney Frank) ("[T]he role of the Government ought to be to protect minorities
who are made vulnerable because of prejudice, whatever the source."). Congress can
use suspect classification factors to improve the principled quality of deliberations over
expansions of the HCSA without being bound by judicial tiers of scrutiny. See Sara K.
Rankin, Prime Suspects? The Viability of Suspect Classification Standards to Develop
Federal Hate Crime Legislation (working paper on file with the author).
46. See, e.g., supra pp. 571-72.
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organizational support or other resources to gather superlative
evidence of their own vulnerability. Therefore, unpopular groups are
inherently less likely to pass higher levels of congressional scrutiny.
Third, when these groups produce whatever evidence they have
garnered in support of their application for coverage under the
HCSA, critics often attack the adequacy of this data-which is, of
course, directly related to why these groups seek coverage under the
HCSA in the first place: to improve access to data about their
vulnerability to bias crimes.
II. EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL BIAS WITH RESPECT TO CURRENTLY
COVERED GROUPS
Currently, the HCSA covers race, religion, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, disability, gender, and gender identity. Over two decades
of legislative history reveals a different journey for each of these
candidate groups: admission to the HCSA was a nebulous application
process, marked by unclear criteria and varying levels of scrutiny.
Aside from the logical prediction that Congress would look to see if a
candidate group was subject to animus-motivated violence, the
vetting process was a black box. But looking back on congressional
records, one thing is clear: the same rules would not necessarily
apply to each candidate group. Even among similarly situated
groups, some would be favored in the selection process and others
would not.
A. The 'Anchoring Trio" of Race, Religion, and Ethnicity
The trio of race, religion, and ethnicity has been referred to as
"the anchoring provisions of all hate crime law" because the trio was
the exclusive focus of early federal hate crime law proposals.47
Indeed, legislative history regarding the HCSA shows a persistent
and exclusive focus on race and religion.48
Although there are several potential explanations for why
Congress adopted this exclusive focus,49 none clearly explain why
47. Jenness, supra note 22, at 548. Frederick Lawrence refers to these groups as
"classic bias crime categories." LAWRENCE, supra note 2, at 17.
48. The early focus of the HSCA can be detected as early as 1983, when "the U.S.
Civil Rights Commission recommended that federal and state authorities should
'develop workable reporting systems that will produce an accurate and comprehensive
measurement of the extent of criminal activity that is clearly based on racial and/or
religious motivations."' Fernandez, supra note 13, at 264 (quoting U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE: RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY IN THE
UNITED STATES 28 (1983)).
49. Jenness concludes that coverage of this trio "occurred without protest from
federal legislators over the appropriateness of these provisions [because the trio] had
already been legitimated by prior decades of civil rights organizing and changes in the
law." Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 672 (internal citations omitted).
But this observation does not fully explain the distinction because gender and sexual
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race, ethnicity, and religion were initially selected over other groups.
The trio could descend from the First Amendment right to religion
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which
has galvanized constitutional protection for race, religion, and
ethnicity.so However, a constitutional precedent would suggest that
other groups with explicit constitutional rights-such as gender,
which is expressed through the Nineteenth Amendment-should
have been included among the first federal hate crime proposals.
The anchoring trio might also descend from the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which covers race, color, ethnicity, national origin.sl Aside
from the parallel inclusion of race, religion, and ethnicity in both the
early federal hate crime bills and the Civil Rights Act, congressional
debates over whether to include a newly proposed group in federal
hate crime legislation sometimes discuss whether the proposed group
is covered by the Civil Rights Act.52 However, the 1964 Act also
covers gender; later extensions of federal civil rights legislation also
cover disability,53 age, 54 familial status,55 and veteran status.56 If the
federal civil rights legislation were the source for early federal hate
crime bills, then Congress not only waited several years before
adding gender and disability, but continues to exclude the other
groups from federal hate crime protections even today. 57
Inspiration for the anchoring trio could also come from the 1969
Federally Protected Activities Act.58 The FPAA prohibits interference
with federally protected activities such as voting, receiving an
orientation had also been at the center of decades of civil rights movements. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., HATE CRIME LEGISLATION 2-3 (2010)
(describing the impact of "the contemporary women's rights movement and the gay
and lesbian rights movement" on hate crime developments and citing Ryken Grattet
and Valerie Jenness, The Birth and Maturation of Hate Crime Policy in the United
States, in HATE AND BIAS CRIME: A READER 389, 392 (Barbara Perry ed., Routledge
(2003))).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
52. Jenness, supra note 22, at 561 (discussing such discourse by Representatives
Dannemeyer, Gekas, and Frank).
53. Vocational Rehabilitation and Other Rehabilitation Services of 1979, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1973); Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328
(1990).
54. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1967).
55. Fair Housing Act § 804(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).
56. Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 4212
(2012).
57. A minority of states include other factors such as "mental or physical disability
or handicap," "age," or "political affiliation." See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE STATE HATE CRIME STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1, 1-2 (2011),
available at http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/statehatecrimelaws.pdf
(charting group coverage under state hate crime provisions as of 2011).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 245 et seq.
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education, or travelling, thereby requiring a basis for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.59 In relevant part, the FPAA criminalizes the use
of "force or threat of force [that] willfully injures, intimidates or
interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with"60
an individual "because of his race, color, religion or national origin
and because" that individual is engaging in certain federally
protected activities.61 But the focus of the FPAA is to protect the
pursuit of certain federally protected activities, so it also contains
broader provisions that prohibit similar interferences with "any
person" engaging in such activities.62
The anchoring trio of race, religion, and ethnicity may also be
traced back to the Anti-Defamation League's ("ADL") historical role
in the "monitoring of bias crimes and the systematic collection of hate
crime data."63 In 1981, the ADL authored and distributed a model
hate crime bill for introduction in state legislatures; the bill provided
enhanced sentences for crimes motivated by the victim's actual or
perceived race, color, national origin, religion, or sexual orientation.64
Over the next several years, various states adopted hate crime
statutes similar to ADL's model; however, early federal bills did not
include sexual orientation.65
All of these precedents show that Congress selected race,
religion, and ethnicity for inclusion in the HCSA over other potential
target groups. But perhaps most significantly, race, religion, and
ethnicity can also be considered the anchoring trio because Congress
subjected them to virtually no pushback in the process of adding
them to federal hate crime legislation:
Although representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) objected to the bill on the grounds that it was unenforceable,
no testimony contested the legitimacy of race, religion, and
ethnicity as core provisions in hate crime legislation. Moreover, no
additional status provisions were mentioned, much less formally
introduced as amendments to the bill. Clearly, this
conceptualization of the social problem was devised by outside
claimsmakers (i.e., [social movement organizations] and their
59. Id. at (b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(E).
60. Id. at (b).
61. Id. at (b)(2).
62. Id. at (b)(1).
63. Jenness, supra note 22, at 556.
64. Hate Crimes Laws: The ADL Approach, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/hate-crimes-law/c/adl-approach-hate-crimes-
laws.html#.VAI59GMnr3A; see also Jenness, supra note 22, at 556-57.
65. Jenness, supra note 22, at 557. The first hate crime bills proposed in 1985
focused exclusively on "racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice." Id. (citing H.R. 775,
99th Cong. (1st Sess. 1985); H.R. 1171, 99th Cong., (1st Sess. 1985)); see also
Fernandez, supra note 13, at 268-69 (discussing legislative history before the proposed
addition of sexual orientation to the HCSA).
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representatives), generally agreed upon by the relevant moral
entrepreneurs, and encountered little resistance when it was
imported into the federal legislative arena. 66
The fact that Congress accepted these groups as the anchoring
trio without scrutiny means that Congress took as a given historical
and contemporary evidence of racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance
and persecution.67 In other words, the anchoring trio represents
"classic bias crime categories"68 because their vulnerability to
prejudice is a consciously "recognizable social pathology within
[American] culture."69 Congress did not require evidence that race,
ethnicity, and religion are vulnerable to bias because its collective
conscience could no longer deny such animus is pervasive and wrong.
Therefore, Congress comfortably intuited that race, ethnicity, and
religion are often targets of bias and deserving of statutory protection
against bias crimes.
B. Sexual Orientation
In sharp contrast, Congress did not accept as given historical
and contemporary evidence of violence committed on the basis of the
victim's real or perceived sexual orientation. The proposals to collect
nationwide statistics concerning bias crimes committed against gays
and lesbians7o sparked fierce, and sometimes vitriolic, legislative
66. Jenness, supra note 22, at 557; see also Fernandez, supra note 13, at 270
("Given the relatively uncontroversial nature of a project designed simply to monitor
racial, religious, and ethnic crime, the bill moved easily through the House, although
the Senate adjourned before it could pass the bill."). The role of "social movement
organizations" is key to the evolution of group coverage in federal hate crime
legislation. Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 676, 679. Social
movement organizations, or SMOs, are interest groups that mobilize and lobby for
certain groups to receive legislative protection. See id. at 676. Indeed, "social
movement-related factors, especially the presence of [SMOs] and expert networks,
provide robust and durable predictors of the criminalization of hate." Jenness, supra
note 22, at 550. Several legal scholars have analyzed how social movement
mobilization impacts constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How
Social Movements Change (Or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New
Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Channeling:
Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001);
Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal
Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001).
67. Jenness concludes that congressional acceptance "occurred without protest
from federal legislators over the appropriateness of these provisions [because they]
had already been legitimated by prior decades of civil rights organizing and changes in
law." Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 672 (internal citation omitted).
But gender and disability had also been at the center of civil rights movements before
1990, so this observation does not clearly explain differences in congressional
receptiveness to these groups as candidates for the HCSA.
68. LAWRENCE, supra note 2, at 13.
69. Id. at 11.
70. Legislative records make clear that Congress perceived the term "sexual
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debates.71
The protracted battle for HCSA coverage of sexual orientation
provides helpful lessons. It revealed four indicators of heightened
congressional resistance to a candidate group, including (1) an
apparent requirement that the candidate group present compelling
evidence of their vulnerability to bias crimes; (2) a tendency to
critique the candidates' proffered data as inflated or inadequate; (3)
moral condemnation of the candidate group, including the portrayal
of the candidates as criminals or perpetrators of violence; and (4) to a
lesser extent, persistent technical arguments, such objections to
statutory definitions of the candidate group as vague or over-
inclusive. As described below, these indicators would not appear with
respect to another candidate group until a similarly controversial
applicant emerged nearly twenty years later. But sexual orientation
would blaze an important trail.
1. 1985-1987: Setting the Stage
Sexual orientation was not included among the original federal
hate crime bills. The first versions of the HCSA, proposed in 1985,
enumerated only the anchoring trio of race, religion, and ethnicity.72
But also in 1985, some members of the House and the Senate
introduced bills to extend the 1964 Civil Rights Act to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.73 Although these
bills died in Committee, the activity suggested support might exist
for adding sexual orientation to the HCSA.
Two years later, on August 7, 1987, Representative John
Conyers (D-MI) introduced H.R. 3193, the first congressional bill to
add sexual orientation to the proposed HCSA.74 Two months later, on
October 7, 1987, the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ") received the
results of a study it had commissioned to examine how police and
orientation" to encompass only "gay men and lesbians." See, e.g., Hate Crime Statistics
Act of 1988: Hearing on S. 702, S. 797 and S. 2000 Before the S. Comm. on the
Constitution, 100th Cong. (1988) [hereinafter Senate 1988 Hearing] (statement of Rep.
John Conyers); see also infra p. 583-84 (explaining some tussles over the meaning and
clarity of the term "sexual orientation").
71. See Fernandez, supra note 13, at 270-81; Jenness, supra note 22, at 557-61.
72. The first versions of the HCSA were proposed in 1985 as H.R. 1171 and H.R.
775. See Hate Crime Statistics Act: Hearing on H.R. 1171 and H.R. 775 Before the
Subcomm. on Crim. Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1985).
Various versions of the bills passed the House but failed to pass the Senate. See, e.g.,
Hate Crime Statistics Act, H.R. 2455, 99th Cong. (1985); Bill Summary and Status:
99th Congress (1985-1986): H.R. 2455: All Congressional Actions, LIBR. OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.govcgi-bin/bdquery/z?d099:HRO2455:@@@X (last visited Apr. 4,
2014).
73. Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1985, H.R. 230, 99th Cong. (1985); Civil
Rights Protection Act of 1988, S. 2109, 100th Cong. (1988).
74. Hate Crime Statistics Act, H.R. 3193, 100th Cong. (1987).
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prosecutors were addressing hate crimes.75 The NIJ Study made
three critical findings: (1) very few jurisdictions had enacted laws
mandating the collection of data on hate crimes;76 (2) "blacks,
Hispanics, Southeast Asians, Jews, and gays and lesbians" are "the
most frequent victims of hate crimes";77 and (3) "[h]omosexuals are
probably the most frequent victims" of hate-motivated violence.78
On October 9, 1987, just two days after the NIJ Study was
reported, the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House
Committee on the Judiciary held an oversight hearing on violence
against gays and lesbians.79 Here, the pivotal role of social movement
organizations became clear: the witness list included testimony from
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force; Community United
Against Violence; New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence; the
"Liaison to the Gay Community" for the District Attorney for the
County of New York; the New York City Police Chief; and the
Institute for the Protection of Lesbian and Gay Youth.8o These
organizations had also secured the assistance of Representative
Franksl and Representative Conyers,82 who were instrumental in
ultimately securing congressional support for the inclusion of sexual
orientation under the HCSA.
Several participants at the hearing commented on an increase in
75. THE RESPONSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO BIAS CRIMES, NAT'L INST.
OF JUSTICE (October 7, 1987) [hereinafter NIJ Study], appended to the Hate Crime
Statistics Act of 1988, Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm.
of the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 123-206 (1988).
76. Id. at 140.
77. Id. at 126.
78. Id.
79. Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1988: Hearing on S. 107, S. 797, and S. 2000
Before the S. Comm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
(1988). Some speakers at these hearings referenced the NIJ Study, but not in great
detail. See, e.g., id. at 98 (statement of Kevin Berrill, Director, Anti-Violence Project,
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force). This was likely due to the fact that the report
was dated (and presumably released) only two days before the hearing.
80. Id.
81. Representative Frank, the first member of Congress to come out as openly gay,
made his announcement in 1987 in the midst of congressional debates over whether to
include sexual orientation under the HCSA. See Alan Silverleib, Frank Discusses
Coming Out As Gay, Going Out As Congressman, CNN (Dec. 2, 2011, 7:23 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/29/politics/barney-frank/. In 2012, Senator Tammy
Baldwin of Wisconsin became the first openly gay person to be elected to the Senate.
Emanuella Grinberg, Wisconsin's Tammy Baldwin is First Openly Gay Person Elected
to Senate, CNN.cOM (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:01PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/wisconsin-tammy-baldwin-senate/.
82. Representative Conyers, one of the founding members of the Congressional
Black Caucus, was known as a passionate supporter of civil rights. See International
Civil Rights Walk of Fame: John Conyers, Jr., NAT'L PARK SERVICE U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/features/malulfeatO02/wof/JohnConyers.htm (last
visited May 13, 2014).
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political power in the gay and lesbian community; however, this
increase was still generally described as fragile and geographically
bound.83 Greater political power and representation was explicitly
recognized as key to securing more favorable treatment by politicians
and police.84 Increased political power and representation was also
understood to have an ameliorative impact on bias; for example,
more diverse police departments are more likely "to do a better job"
serving diverse communities.85 Similarly, political power and
representation facilitate a sort of "six degrees of separation"
phenomenon that can undercut prejudice. One proponent explained:
We know that when members of the majority groups can interact
with a person from a minority group and have an ongoing
relationship with that person, it really does a lot to educate the
person and to reduce prejudice. . . . [I]t seems the most important
thing [to combat prejudice] is for heterosexual people to know an
openly lesbian or gay person. Today it is likely that most people in
this country do know someone who is gay, but they don't know that
the person they know is gay. In public opinion polls, about 25 to 30
percent of the American public say that they know someone who is
openly gay. We need to increase that figure dramatically.86
Proponents also drew from another key theme: to analogize the
gay and lesbian community to the anchoring trio of race, religion,
and ethnicity.87 Although the HCSA had yet to be enacted, but
advocates realized that congressional debate thus far had accepted
the notion that race, religion, and ethnicity were groups vulnerable
to animus. For example, several witnesses at the hearing wore pink
triangles. One proponent explained the basis of the association:
[T]he badge ... identified homosexual inmates of Nazi
concentration camps. Although it is an often overlooked fact, tens of
83. See Anti-Gay Violence Hearing, supra note 45, at 1 (statement of Rep. Conyers)
(stating that the murders of San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and City
Supervisor Harvey Milk "symbolized the growing political strength of the gay
community, as well as the hostility directed toward them, which became more
prominent as a result of political empowerment"); see also id at 28-30 (noting remedial
steps and legislation in jurisdictions such as California and New York City and
contemplating its effectiveness).
84. See, e.g., id. at 28-30 (including discussions among several hearing
participants).
85. Id. at 25 (statement of Rep. Frank).
86. Id. at 26 (statement of Dr. Gregory M. Herek, American Psychological
Association).
87. See Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 673 n.62 ("[Aldvocates for
gays and lesbians successfully made the case that violence against gays and lesbians
was as epidemic and consequential as violence against people of color, immigrants, and
Jews.") (citation omitted); see also, Jenness, supra note 22, at 558 (noting that
supporters at the hearing explicitly drew analogies between the violence suffered by




thousands of gay persons were herded into the camps and, along
with Jews, gypsies and others, were gassed and incinerated. We
wear the triangle to remember them and to remind all people of the
terrible cost of bigotry.88
But the core of the proponents' case was a range of statistical
and anecdotal evidence suggesting that anti-gay violence was a
serious national problem. Proffered data indicated that "[m]ore than
1 in 5 gay men and nearly 1 in 10 lesbians had been physically
assaulted because of their sexual orientation."89 Framed another
way, "a significant minority of lesbian and gay respondents-between
15 and 25 percent-have been punched, kicked, or beaten because of
their sexual orientation."90 Other data suggested anti-gay violence in
San Francisco had increased from the previous year by 61 percent;
New York reported a 41 percent increase over the prior year and a 91
percent increase in the first few months of 1986.91 Written and oral
witness testimony, recounting statistical and anecdotal evidence of
the seriousness and pervasiveness of anti-gay violence, ultimately
generated a hearing transcript of over 220 pages. 92
Advocates acknowledged the "limitations" of their data.93
Although the problem of anti-gay violence had been described as
gaining visibility,94 the relatively limited political power and
resources of the gay and lesbian community impeded the collection of
purely scientific or refined data.95 Still, the best available data
commonly established the significance of anti-gay violence.96
Although proponent testimony was primarily focused on
evidence of violent crime, some underscored a link between violence
and the larger social and psychological marginalization of the gay
and lesbian community. Significantly, the hearing occurred just a few
months after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick, which upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy law.97 Several
witnesses argued that anti-sodomy laws and the Bowers decision
88. Anti-Gay Violence Hearing, supra note 45, at 5 (statement of Kevin Berrill).
89. Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
90. Id. at 12 (statement of Dr. Herek).
91. Id. at 1 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
92. See id.
93. Id. at 3 (statement of Kevin Berrill) (acknowledging such limits, but also
clarifying the NGLTF study "has been widely praised by sociologists and
criminologists. [The] findings have been confirmed by local and State studies, which
have shown similar high rates of harassment and violence.").
94. Id. at 4-5. The hearing transcript reflects other similar statements. See also id.
at 29 (statement of Dr. Herek) (discussing the increasing visibility of the gay
community and consequent reactions).
95. Id. at 12-13 (statement of Dr. Herek).
96. Id.
97. 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986).
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"legitimat[ed] hostility toward gay people."98 Such mainstreaming of
anti-gay sentiment was also evident in common responses to the
victims of anti-gay violence, who are often blamed for "inviting the
attack or deserving it."99 The hearing is replete with such discussion
of how such institutional validation of bias urges society to view gays
and lesbians "as second-class citizens,"100 thereby facilitating and
sustaining a broader culture of prejudice against homosexuality. 101
The hearing also exposed a related discursive tactic to portray
homosexuals as perpetrators of crime as opposed to potential
victimS.102 This rhetoric frames homosexuality as something society
should fear and fortify itself against, as opposed to a status that
deserves statutory protection:
The so-called dangers of the homosexual range from a danger to the
family to a danger to civilization. Homosexuals are repeatedly held
up as dangers to children despite the repeated evidence that
heterosexual child abuse and heterosexual sexual molestation is
endemic in our society. Homosexuals have even been accused of
causing crime in the streets .... 1os
Thus, the criminalization of homosexuality in legislative,
judicial, and social discourse, proponents argued, demonstrates and
sustains a climate of hate that, in turn, supports the commission of
bias crimes against gays and lesbians.104
98. See Anti-Gay Violence Hearing, supra note 45, at 13 (statement of Dr. Herek).
David Wertheimer from the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project
similarly described the role of Bowers in legitimating violence against homosexuality:
"When the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court states an opinion and discusses
extensively the way in which homosexuality used to be a capital crime, it is something
some Americans will interpret as license to go out and hurt us, attack us." Id. at 18
(statement of Mr. Wertheimer). See also id. at 29 (statement of Diana Christensen,
Community United Against Violence) (discussing the gay panic defense as another
societal expression of bias that validates the victimization of homosexual
communities).
99. Id. at 12 (statement of Dr. Herek).
100. Id. at 30-31 (statement of Kevin Berrill).
101. See id. at 16-17; see also id. at 25-26 (statement of Mr. Wertheimer); id. at 27-
31 (discussions among several hearing participants).
102. See, e.g., id. at 114 (statement of Ms. Joyce Hunter, Institute for the Protection
of Lesbian and Gay Youth) ("[L]ike the Jews in Europe and the blacks in this country,
homosexuals are accused of the very violence that is perpetrated against them.
Kenneth Gangel, a fundamentalist minister, accuses homosexuals of gang rape as a
regular occurrence.").
103. Id. at 147 (statement of Dr. A. Damien Martin, Executive Director, Institute
for the Protection of Lesbian and Gay Youth).
104. Congressional hearings are replete with other examples of the societal
facilitation of homophobia. See, e.g., id. at 113 (statement of Ms. Hunter) ("We have
recently had the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court suggest that homosexual behavior
between consenting adults is worse than violent rape."); id. at 201 (statement of Dr.
Martin P. Levine, The American Sociological Association) ("Our legislatures, schools,
and churches . . . perpetuate and reinforce anti-homosexual sentiments . . . .").
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2. 1988 in the House: Gaining a Toehold
Not one witness appeared at the Anti-Gay Violence hearing to
oppose the common narrative that bias against gays and lesbians
was a significant national problem.105 Instead, opponents waited
until the April 20, 1988 House Report on H.R. 3193 to emerge.10 6 The
report focused mostly on the perceived need for the federal collection
of data on hate crimes; 107 it also summarized data on the incidence of
hate crimes against the proposed covered groups: race, religion,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation.108 But significantly, the dissenting
views targeted only sexual orientation. 109
Opponents attacked the credibility of statistical evidence of
homophobic violence, contending that supporters were inflating the
statistics and using the HCSA "merely [as] a tempting vehicle to
dramatize what [supporters] assert is an increase in crime against
homosexuals."10 The evidence, opponents argued, did not suggest
that "crime against gays and lesbians is perpetrated through the use
of interstate networks such as those employed by the Ku Klux Clan
which 'transcend[] the ability of individual States to respond . . .' and
thus require the intervention of federal law enforcement."111 Despite
the evidence proffered at the Anti-Gay Violence hearing and the
contemporaneous NIJ Studyll2 that confirmed the prevalence of bias
crimes on the basis of the victim's sexual orientation, the dissenters
maintained that "there appear[ed] no convincing evidence that
homosexuals are more targeted for crime than [other] groups."113
Finally, opponents objected to the statutory term "sexual
orientation" as too broad, and maintained that the addition of the
term would render the data collection process too expensive.114
105. See id. at 1-31.
106. H.R. REP. No. 100-575, at 12-13 (1988).
107. Id. at 2-7.
108. Id. at 8-11 (additional views of Rep. Conyers).
109. Id. at 12-13.
110. Id. at 12 (dissenting views of Reps. Gekas (R-PA), McCollum (R-FL), Coble (R-
NC), Dannemeyer (R-CA), and Smith (R-TX) to H.R. 3193). For a discussion of similar
tactics, see Fernandez, supra note 13, at 279.
111. Fernandez, supra note 13, at 273 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-575, at 12).
112. See supra Part II.B.1.
113. H.R. REP. No. 100-575, at 12 (dissenting views of Reps Gekas, McCollum,
Coble, Dannemeyer, and Smith to H.R. 3193).
114. Id. (noting that H.R. 3193 added "something described as the 'sexual
orientation' of the victim" and suggesting that the legislation as written would come at
"considerable cost"). Similar objections to the vagueness of the term "sexual
orientation" were raised frequently. See, e.g., Fernandez, supra note 13, at 276-280;
Jenness, supra note 22, at 560 (describing objections to the term "sexual orientation,"
including Representative Swindall's (R-GA) statement that the phrase was too
ambiguous and "could very easily . . . be construed to include child molestation")
(internal citations omitted).
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Ultimately, Representative Gekas offered an amendment on the
House floor to remove the term "sexual orientation," purporting to
rationalize the amendment on overbreadth concerns.115 Instead, the
Gekas amendment was countered with another amendment from
Representative John Miller (R-WA) to replace "sexual orientation"
with "homosexuality or heterosexuality" and to add a provision
clarifying "that nothing in the Act creates or expands civil rights not
currently recognized by law."116 The Miller Amendment passed by a
vote of 384 to 30.117 As amended, H.R. 3193 passed the House by a
vote of 383 to 29.118
3. 1988 in the Senate: The Shut Down
Before H.R. 3193 was submitted to a vote in the House, on
January 25, 1988 the Senate introduced a companion bill, S. 2000.119
On June 21, 1988, shortly after the House passed H.R. 3913, the
Senate held a hearing.120 The list of witnesses, both in terms of
members of Congress and outside social movement organizations,
was substantial.121 Like the prior hearings, the June 1988 Senate
hearing centered on the need for the HCSA, as well as statistical and
anecdotal evidence of bias crimes directed at the all of the candidate
groups. 122 Most of the testimony and supporting documentation did
115. See 134 CONG. REC. 11,403 (1988) (amendment introduced by Rep. Gekas on
May 18, 1988).
116. See id. at 404 (amendment introduced by Rep. Miller on May 18, 1988).
117. See H.R. REP. No. 101-109, at 2 (1989) (stating that H.R. 3193 "was amended
on the House floor"). A few weeks later, Representative Gekas expressed some
discomfort with the result of the maneuvering on the House floor and stated that he
now felt "constrained to support this legislation":
I . . . felt . . . we were wading in dangerous waters when we were
attempting to raise the homosexuals to a constitutionally guaranteed or
protected class which was not in accord with race, creed, and color, as was
already articulated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. So I attempted at that
time to say that if we were going to include the homosexuals, why not
include the handicapped, the elderly, the infants, and other classes of people
in our society who might be the victims of hate crimes?
The will of the Congress was to supplant my concern with placing another
category juxtaposed to homosexuals; namely, heterosexuals, and put them
both in the statute as protected classes without violating the age-old concern
... I have that they are not in effect constitutionally protected classes ....
15 CONG. REC. 13542 (1989) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
118. 134 CONG. REC. 3389 (1988).
119. 134 CONG. REC. 3, at 26 (1988).
120. The hearing concerned three different HCSA bills, but only one, S. 2000
(introduced by Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA)), added a provision for "affectional or
sexual orientation." See Senate 1988 Hearing, supra note 70. S. 702 (introduced by
Sen. Paul Simon (D-IL)) and S. 797 (introduced by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH))
were virtually identical and concerned only race, religion, and ethnicity. See id. at 54.
121. See id. at II.
122. See, e.g., id. at 20 (Sen. Simon's commentary on the government's obligation to
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not distinguish sexual orientation from the anchoring trio; the
candidate groups were generally referenced together.123 Some notable
exceptions reviewed statistical and anecdotal data and arguments
specifically relating to the bid to add sexual orientation.124
A hallmark of the June 1988 Senate hearing was the emphasis
on societal and governmental blindness to gay bias crimes. This
critique was helpfully rooted in the NIJ Study, which concluded that
"[h]omosexuals are probably the most frequent victims" of hate-
motivated violence and that gay Americans are frequently targeted
for assault and vandalism.125 The NIJ Study also reviewed the
tendency of state legislatures to specifically exclude homosexuals
from coverage under hate crime legislation and suggested that such
exclusion "either condones bias crime[s] against gays and lesbians or
suggests it does not exist."126 The Study even suggested that
blindness to bias crimes is actually a form of societal prejudice
against the victims:
For the most part, the criminal justice system-like the rest of
society-has not recognized the seriousness of the hate violence
problem. Police officers, prosecutors, and judges tend to regard most
incidents as juvenile pranks, harmless vandalism, private matters
between the involved parties, or acceptable behavior against disliked
groups.
12 7
Joan Weiss, Executive Director of the National Institute Against
Prejudice and Violence, picked up on this theme, attacking denials
that hate crime was a legitimate national problem:
We don't need this legislation to tell us there's a problem. Those
of us who monitor the problem know that it's an issue that needs to
be addressed, but do not have the resources to turn it around.
Only public officials can do that and the problem in this country
is that public officials, for the most part-police departments, county
act when "evidence shows that certain groups are targeted").
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., id. at 94-102 (statement of Kevin Berrill); id. at 103-09 (statement of
Reverend Charles Bergstrom, Former Director of the Lutheran Office for
Governmental Affairs); id. at 241-43 (statement of Leonard 0. Goodstein, Ph.D.,
American Psychological Association); id. at 253-54 (statement of Sen. John Kerry (D-
MA)); id. at 12-17 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
125. NIJ Study, supra note 75, at 126.
126. Id. at 159.
127. Id. at 126. The Study continued the observation:
Many criminal justice system personnel do not believe that hate violence
exists in their community. Others are aware it exists but are reluctant to
publicize the fact for fear their communities' will be branded as racist or
hotbeds of violence. Lack of police and prosecutor attention to bias crime





executives, legislators, mayors, Governors-do not believe this is a
serious problem. The citizens of this country have a great deal of
denial going on. And the problem, therefore, cannot be addressed. 128
In fact, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights quite
unintentionally demonstrated its own blindness to anti-gay bias at
the hearing.129 The Commission's Acting Chairman, Murray
Friedman, extolled the Commission for fighting "bigotry-related
crime" because a few months earlier, it issued a resolution for
Congress to enact legislation to mandate "the collection of hate
crimes data."130 But Friedman also acknowledged that "several
Commissioners [had] objected" to the original version of the
resolution because it included sexual orientation.131 Once sexual
orientation was removed from the resolution language, the
Commissioners unanimously approved it. 132
Despite the evidence and testimony in the hearing-including
the admonitions not to ignore the evidence and impact of hate
crimes-the Senate did not act on H.R. 3193 or S. 2000 before the
100th Congress adjourned.133
4. 1989: Poison in the House
On June 23, 1989, the 101st Congress issued a report on the
latest pending HCSA bill, H.R. 1048, a reintroduction of H.R. 3193.134
The report reviewed familiar arguments and evidence in support of
the bill's passage. 135 Conservative authorl36 and Congressman
128. See Senate 1988 Hearing, supra note 70, at 72.
129. Id. at 217.
130. Id. at 217, 223.
131. Id. at 224.
132. Id. at 231 (appending news release, "Rights Commission Issues Hate Crimes
Resolution," Feb. 12, 1988).
133. See H.R. REP. No. 101-109, at 2 ('The bill passed the House by a vote of 383 to
293 and was pending in the Senate when the 100th Congress adjourned.").
134. H.R. REP. NO.101-109.
135. See id. at 2-4. One unique but short-lived development was a proposal by
Representative Gekas "to allow the Attorney General to include any additional
category of victims he deems appropriate." 135 CONG. REC. 13549 (1989).
Representative Conyers described his perception of Gekas's particular amendment was
"to make the legislation more inclusive." Id. Representative Conyers stated: "I am
aware that interest has been expressed in having crimes against women and the
elderly included in the bill, and perhaps through further congressional hearings on
hate crimes, a record can be created to support action in that regard by the Attorney
General." Id. Gekas's language survived the final passage of H.R. 1048 in the House,
but appears to have been set aside in conference. The Senate companion to H.R. 1048,
S. 419, did not contain Gekas's language. See id. There is no clear record of how or why
Congress removed the language granting discretion to the Attorney General to cover
new groups under the HCSA.
136. Representative Dannemeyer authored an anti-homosexuality text, SHADOW IN
THE LAND: HOMOSEXUALITY IN AMERICA (1989), just before the 1990 enactment of the
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William Dannemeyer (R-CA) penned the Dissenting View. 137
Representative Dannemeyer opined that the point of hate crime
legislation was to "convey[ the entirely reasonable message that
some hate crimes are worse than others."138 He defended the
inclusion of race, color, religion, and national origin on the grounds
they were named in the 1964 Civil Rights Act; therefore, it was
appropriate to infer these groups were subject to the "worse" variety
of prejudice.139 But, "homosexuality . . . does not fit into that
honorable tradition."140 To embellish his point, Representative
Dannemeyer quoted "an eloquent civil rights activist," Dr. David
Pencel4l:
Homosexual behavior is a completely different category of activity
which . . . cannot be seriously considered even an analogue of race
or gender. The freedom train has been hijacked. The new agenda of
the civil rights movement will not be written until the philosophical
and social tenets of the sexual revolutionaries are exposed as
inimical to the poor. While feminists cry for an end to patriarchy,
the poor demand responsible fathers. While homosexuals cry for
sexual license, the poor demand sexual discipline.142
Representative Dannemeyer repeated his objections and his
quoted materials three days later, when then-Representative Charles
Schumer (D-NY) moved to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 1048.143
HCSA. In it, Representative Dannemeyer not only generally excoriates homosexuality,
but he also specifically criticizes the inclusion of sexual orientation in the HCSA.
137. H.R.REP. NO. 101-109, at 9-10.
138. Id. at 9.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. The basis for Representative Dannemeyer's characterization of Pence as a
"civil rights activist" is unclear. Pence wrote a book, RELIGION, SEX, AND POLITICS: FOR
MEN ONLY (2012). An editorial review of the book states that Pence "served one year
as a VISTA volunteer in a black community in Wilmington, Delaware in 1967."
Editorial Review of Religion, Sex, and Politics, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/Religion-Politics-M-D-David-Pence/dp/159526065X (last
visited Feb. 13, 2014). Representative Dannemeyer would later state that Dr. Pence
"marched with the civil rights activists in the South prior to the adoption of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964." 135 CONG. REC. 13546 (1989).
142. H.R. REP. NO. 101-109, at 9 (dissenting views of Rep. Dannemeyer).
Representative Dannemeyer also professed to expose the "ultimate goal of homosexual
rights legislation" by quoting a "homosexual activist." Id. at 10. The basis for
Representative Dannemeyer's attribution of the quote to a "homosexual activist" is
unclear; Representative Dannemeyer later attributed the quote to a "homosexual
publication[] ... called Guide." 135 CONG. REC. 13545 (1989).
143. 135 CONG. REC. 3179, 3184 (1989). But when Representative Dannemeyer
repeated the quote from Dr. David Pence, Representative Barney Frank challenged
the apparent dig at feminism:
[I]n the quotation the gentleman read, he listed among the enemies of the
poor, feminism. Is it also his intention to strike sex from this? He read a
statement there which denounced feminists as also being antipoor. In this
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Representative Dannemeyer was among those who objected to a
suspension, suggesting that the House should consider amendments
that had been previously voted down.144 Although outspoken,
Representative Dannemeyer was not alone. Several other members
of Congress endeavored to sink the bill by calling for coverage of
union members.145 Such proposals, recognized as poison pills, were
unsupported by the union lobby and had been repeatedly rejected in
the House.146 These tangles stymied progress, and H.R. 1048 died
before Congress adjourned.
5. 1990: The Dark Before the Dawn
While Congress squabbled over the bid to add sexual orientation
to the HCSA, gay and lesbian organizations continued to coordinate.
By 1990, a formidable coalition emerged, including an extensive
range of general civil rights organizations, as well as bi-partisan
support from Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Paul Simon (D-IL).147
On February 8, 1990, Congress debated S. 419, a companion bill to
H.R. 1048.148 Senator Simon wasted no time in tackling the heart of
the matter: "The area that is most controversial . . . is whether we
include gay and lesbian groups here."149 Senator Hatch tried to pitch
his support to conservatives: "I do not condone homosexual activity,
and I do not support separate civil rights legislation for homosexuals.
But I certainly do not believe anyone should be beaten up,
vandalized, or otherwise criminally assaulted, regardless of what
effort to clean this bill up is he also going to strike sex as one of the bases on
which we would classify?
Representative Frank's underlying reference to a bill is unclear. It is possible that he
meant the pending bill, H.R. 1048; however, gender was not a proposed category. H.R.
1048, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990). It is also possible Representative Frank meant the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Representative Dannemeyer had vaguely referenced,
but then Representative Frank's reference to Representative Dannemeyer's position on
pending legislation would not make sense. Perhaps the most interesting thing about
this passionate interaction is that Representative Dannemeyer's attack on
homosexuality and feminism prompted Representative Frank to outwardly confront
only the latter.
144. 135 CONG. REC. 3170, 3183 (1989).
145. H.R. REP. No. 101-109 at 7-8 (additional views of Reps Hyde (R-IL), McCollum,
Coble, Slaughter (R-VA), Smith (R-TX), Smith (R-MS), Douglas (R-NH), and James (R-
FL)).
146. This tactic had been tried before by Senator Grassley, who unsuccessfully
proposed an amendment to H.R. 3193 that would have added "crimes that manifest
evidence of prejudice based on membership or non-membership in a labor
organization" and that would have added the crime of "extortion" to the enumerated
crimes. See S. REP. No.100-514, at 5. The Grassley Amendment was defeated 5-7. Id.
See discussion of other poison pill efforts at infra note 241 and accompanying text.
147. See 136 CONG. REC. 1067 (1990) (listing various agencies and organizations
supporting S. 419).
148. 136 CONG. REC. 1067-1092 (1990).
149. 136 CONG. REC. 1072 (1990).
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that person may be or what that person's lifestyle is . . . ."150
But Senator Hatch's perspective was rejected by many
conservatives,151 including the indomitable Senator Jesse Helms (R-
NC). Although prior hearings explained that homophobic rhetoric
actually supports the commission of bias crimes against gays and
lesbians,152 instead of rebutting such rhetoric, Senator Helms
actually sought to capitalize on it. He opened with the claim that
Senate Bill 419 was "the flagship of the homosexual, lesbian
legislative agenda,"153 and "simply one step in their radical
revolution."154 As a result, "[s]tudying hate crimes against
homosexuals [would be] a crucial first step toward achieving
homosexual rights and legitimacy in American society."155 Inclusion
of sexual orientation in the HCSA would therefore undermine
"traditional" family values by promoting homosexuality. 156
The problem of anti-gay violence, according to Senator Helms,
was an illusion: Senate Bill 419 was "dreamed up by the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force," and "militant homosexuals" were
"building up numbers of complaints-not ... criminal offenses or
charges."157 In fact, Senator Helms declared, even assuming
NGLTF's reports of violent crimes against gays and lesbians were
true, the number of reported crimes was "a relatively minute number
compared to their percentage of the population." 158
Not only should Congress discredit such manufactured evidence
of anti-gay violence, Senator Helms opined, but it should recognize
150. 136 CONG. REC. 1075 (1990).
151. Nineteen members of Congress voted for Senator Helms' proposed amendment
to Senate Bill 419. 136 CONG. REC. 1086 (1990). See infra note 166 and accompanying
text.
152. Congressional hearings are replete with other examples of the societal
generation and support of homophobia. See, e.g., Anti-Gay Violence Hearing, supra
note 45, at 114 (statement of Dr. Herek) ("We recently had the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court suggest that homosexual behavior between consenting adults is worse
than violent rape."); see id. at 203 (statement of Martin P. Levin, The American
Sociological Association) ("Our legislatures, schools, and churches ... perpetuate and
reinforce anti-homosexual sentiments . . . ."). Of course, individuals are free to hold
discriminatory views, but the Constitution's equal protection guarantee prevents such
prejudice from being given the force of law: "[t]he Constitution cannot control such
prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
153. Senator Helms observed "a great deal of political clout of the homosexual
community." 136 CONG. REC. 1076 (1990).
154. 136 CONG. REC. 1764 (1990)
155. 136 CONG. REC. 1770 (1990) (statement of Sen. Helms).
156. Fernandez, supra note 13, at 278-81 (internal citations omitted).
157. Instead, Helms proclaimed, "80 percent of so-called hate crimes against




homosexuals as the perpetrators of crimes instead of as potential
victims.159 He described some specific "hate crimes" perpetrated by
homosexuals, including "unspeakable acts" committed by pairs of gay
men in Senator Helms's office, prompting Senator Helms to secure
the intervention of the U.S. Marshal.160 Another alleged episode,
originally reported by conservative Pat Buchanan, involved the
invasion of a Catholic church by "dozens of homosexuals," who "began
screaming, and standing on pews, and tossing condoms in the air."161
But, Senator Helms fumed,162 there was no "outcry" or "prosecution
of these criminals" because of "the homosexual apologists in the
media and in politics."163
Senators Hatch and Simon sought to throw water on Senator
Helms's speech by offering Amendment 1250. Amendment 1250,
Senators Hatch and Simon hoped, would assuage Senator Helms and
other conservative dissenters because it was an express assurance
that the HCSA would not be "misperceived as stamping
congressional approval on homosexuality." 164 Amendment 1250
expressly articulated that:
1. The American family life is the foundation of American society,
2. Federal policy should encourage the well-being, financial
security, and health of the American family,
3. Schools should not deemphasize the critical value of American
family life.
(B) Nothing in this Act shall be construed, nor shall any funds be
appropriated to carry out the purpose of the Act be used, to
promote or encourage homosexuality. 165
The Hatch-Simon Amendment was unanimously approved; even
Senator Helms and other dissenters voted for it, at least
momentarily.166
159. 136 CONG. REC. 1761 (1990).
160. 136 CONG. REC. 1762 (1990).
161. 136 CONG. REC. 1764 (1990) (statement of Sen. Helms).
162. The record supports this characterization. Id. ("I say to my friend from Illinois
[Senator Simon], if I sound like I am worked up, I am worked up.") (statement of Sen.
Helms).
163. Id. Senator Helms implored, "This is the crowd we want to follow, do we not, in
deciding what legislation we are going to pass and what legislation we are not going to
pass?" Id.
164. 136 CONG. REC. 1767 (1990).
165. Id. Amendment 1250 passed by a vote of ninety-six to zero. 136 CONG. REC.
1769 (1990).
166. Senator Helms's support, and apparently that of 19 other conservative
members of Congress, was qualified. Just after the Hatch-Simon Amendment was
approved, Senator Helms proposed Amendment 1251, which provided in relevant part:
(1) the homosexual movement threatens the strength and survival of the
American family as the basic unit of society; (2) State sodomy laws should be
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But proponents did not limit their strategies to compromise.
Supporters, proffering "voluminous" evidence of hate crimes
committed against gays and lesbians,167 also responded that the bill
"'simply' requires the collection of data 'to guide the efforts of police,
prosecutors, and public' against hate crime."168 Numerous law
enforcement organizations disputed opponents' claims that the bill
would be too vague or difficult to implement.169 To the contrary,
supporters argued, passage of the bill would improve state and local
awareness, reporting, and training around bias crimes through the
collection and provision of reliable federal data.7e Ultimately, the
exclusion of sexual orientation from the bill would signal that
"[c]rimes against gays and lesbians [were] . . . less significant, less
pervasive, and less reprehensible than crimes motivated by racial,
religious, or ethnic prejudice."171
Just before the final vote on Senate Bill 419, Senator Barbara
Mikulski (D-MD) made an impassioned statement in support.
Although her comments presumably addressed the need for hate
crime legislation generally, Senator Mikulski's statements could have
easily been addressed to the members of Congress who opposed the
addition of sexual orientation to the HCSA:
Why do we hate? We hate because we fear. We fear what we do
not understand. We are afraid of strangers. We are afraid of people
who are different. We are afraid that they are going to take what is
ours. We fear they want to change us and we drive them away
because we are threatened. We hate rather than overcome fear.172
After three years of battle, reams of data, pages of testimony,
and fervent advocacy from a range of organizations and officials,
Congress finally waded through the rhetorical blood on the floor and
passed the HCSA-with coverage for sexual orientation-by a vote of
92-4.173 Although supporters ultimately prevailed in their quest to
include sexual orientation under the HCSA, the battle was a
protracted and bitter one. Social movement organizations were
essential; supporters needed sufficient political power,
enforced because they are in the best interest of public health; (3) the
Federal Government should not provide discrimination protections on the
basis of sexual orientation; and (4) school curriculums should not condone
homosexuality as an acceptable lifestyle in American society.
136 CONG. REC. 1770 (1990). Senator Helms's amendment was rejected by a vote of
nineteen to seventy-seven. 136 CONG. REC. 1773.
167. Fernandez, supra note 13, at 273 (detailing the data).
168. Id. at 271-73 (describing Rep. Conyers's advocacy in support of the bill).
169. Id. at 273-74.
170. Id. at 275.
171. Id. at 274.
172. 136 CONG. REC. 1082 (1990).
173. 136 CONG. REC. 1082 (1990).
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representation, and organization to secure the support necessary to
overcome legislative resistance.174
Sexual orientation's long and embattled journey on to the HCSA
revealed four indicators of heightened congressional resistance to a
candidate group, including (1) an apparent requirement that the
candidate group present compelling evidence of their vulnerability to
bias crimes; (2) a tendency to critique the candidates' proffered data
as inflated or inadequate; (3) moral condemnation of the candidate
group, including the portrayal of the candidates as criminals or
perpetrators of violence; and (4) to a lesser extent, technical
arguments, such objections to statutory definitions of the candidate
group as vague or over-inclusive. These indicators were not evident
in the decision to add any other candidate groups to the HCSA,
including the next group to be covered: disability.
C. Disability
Congress first added disability to federal hate crime legislation
in 1994, when it was specifically incorporated into the new
Sentencing Act and incorporated into the reauthorized HCSA.175
There is a dearth of legislative history to shed light on why disability
was not included in the HCSA at the time of its passage in 1990, but
at least one scholar opines that "Congress apparently did not think
that disabled people compromised [sic] a 'high risk' group in relation
to interpersonal violence" in the early phases of deliberating the
scope of hate crime legislation.176 Other scholars apparently attribute
the delay in adding disability to a lack of advocacy from social
movement organizations and other activist groups.177
What is remarkable about the 1994 incorporation of disability
into federal hate crime law is that it occurred not only without
significant advocacy from disability advocates178 but also with
virtually no congressional discussion.179 In fact, Congress never held
174. Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 671 (citing civil rights
activism and "identity politics" as reasons for the increased support). Of course, the
irony is that the most vulnerable groups often do not have such organizational
support. As explained infra, the homeless are a perfect example of a group that falls
into a "dialogic default" where their needs and rights are soundly ignored by both the
legislative and judicial branches, but they lack the organization, support, or
representation to overcome the deficit. See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever:
Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law & Dialogical Default, 35
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 631-32 (2008).
175. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act § 320926.
176. Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 676 (quoting Barbara Faye
Waxman, Hatred: The Unacknowledged Dimension in Violence Against Disabled
People, 9 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 185, 186 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id. at 673-77.
178. See id. at 673-76.
179. Caught in the Crossfire: Kids Talk About Guns, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
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a hearing to discuss bias crimes directed at those with disabilities. 180
Instead, the term disability was "simply" inserted into the definition
of hate crimes in the Sentencing Act by a proposed amendment,
which was accepted without objection or discussion before a favorable
Senate vote of 95 to 4.181 Thus, the incorporation of disability into the
HCSA, through the Sentencing Act, was a non-event. 1 82
Why did Congress so easily incorporate disability into the HCSA,
especially when compared to congressional battles over the addition
of sexual orientation? The discrepancy cannot be explained on the
basis of evidence-no evidence of bias crimes against the disabled
was proffered or debated. Perhaps Congress silently recalled
evidence from hearings over the 1990 Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"), which demonstrated the prevalence of discrimination
against the disabled.183 But the ADA hearings occurred over four
years prior to the addition of disability to the HCSA,184 and they did
not directly address bias crimes related to the disabled. Moreover,
Congress held hearings on bias crimes committed against gays and
lesbians, and these hearings were contemporaneous with the
enactment of the HCSA;185 still, Congress mightily resisted the
on Crime & Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing 1994J.
180. Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 674-75.
181. See Senate Hearing 1994, supra note 179. The inspiration to add disability
might have come in part from a July 29, 1992 hearing before the Subcommittee on
Crime and Criminal Justice. At that hearing, Congress compared the proposed federal
law with an existing Wisconsin law. Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1992:
Hearing on H.R. 4797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 184 (1992). Both laws listed race, religion,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation. Id. The Wisconsin law also included disability. Id. at
184.
182. The relative ease of the addition of the disabled to the HCSA is not to suggest
that effective implementation of the law has been easy. See Grattet & Jenness,
Criminology, supra note 8, at 678-79 (discussing the challenges to implementation of
disability in hate crime legislation).
183. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(explaining that discrimination against individuals with disabilities remains a serious
social problem). See Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 2, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000) (No. 99-1240), 2000
WL 1154031, at *2 ("[T]he ADA itself was a product of several years of negotiation and
compromise, the very kind of consultation and fact-gathering suggested by this Court
in City of Cleburne . . . ."); see also Waxman, supra note 176, at 189 ("Violence toward
disabled people has .. . been part of the federal record for many years . . . .").
184. Rebecca Hill, Passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A SOCIAL AND STRUCTURAL REVOLUTION,
http://37616344.nhd.weebly.com/passing-the-ada.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2014)
(stating that the draft of the Americans with Disabilities Act was introduced to
Congress in September of 1989).
185. See Senate 1988 Hearing, supra note 70, at 1, 12; Fernandez, supra note 13, at
263 (noting that the HSCA was passed in 1990).
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addition of sexual orientation despite the presentation of
"irrefutable" 186 and "voluminous" 187 evidence of anti-gay bias.
Perhaps the lack of statutory precedent regarding sexual
orientation could explain some of the difference in Congressional
response. The HCSA was the first major federal law to recognize
discrimination against gays and lesbians,188 so the lack of a
precedent comparable to the ADA might be one reason for increased
Congressional resistance to the addition of sexual orientation in
comparison to the disabled. But the sexual orientation lobby had
extraordinary support from social movement organizations,189 and
Congress added disability to the HCSA despite a lack of any outside
pressure. 19 0
Simply put, there are no principled criteria to justify the stark
difference in tenor over Congressional deliberations to add disability
in comparison to sexual orientation. But at least one unprincipled
reason for such differential treatment is unrecognized bias.
D. Gender
Gender, like disability, was added to the Sentencing Act in
1994.191 Although gender's road to the HCSA was more circuitous
and bumpy than that taken by disability, it proved to be nothing like
the battle waged over sexual orientation. Gender was first suggested
as a potential candidate for federal hate crime protection in a 1986
hearing on "Ethnically-Motivated Violence Against Arab-
186. See Senate 1988 Hearing, supra note 70, at 75, 79 (statement of Joan Weiss,
Executive Director, The National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence) (explaining
that research shows that thousands of incidents of crime motivated by sexual
orientation and bias and other bias occur each year).
187. Fernandez, supra note 13, at 273 (noting that Congressman Conyers was
"armed with voluminous data on hate crime").
188. Hate Crime Protections Timeline: Task Force's Long History of Combating Hate
Crimes Against Our Community, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/issues/hate-crimes-main-page/timeline (last visited Apr.
13, 2014).
189. Hate Crime Protections Historical Overview: Task Force's Long History of
Working to Secure Hate Crimes Protections for LGBT People, NATIONAL GAY AND
LESBIAN TASK FORCE,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/issues/hate-crimes.-main-page/overview (last visited Apr.
13, 2014).
190. See Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
191. See Act of Aug. 26, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003(a), 108 Stat. 1781
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012)) (extending the definition of a hate
crime to include those motivated by bias against gender). Although the Sentencing Act
modified the HCSA to collect data on disability bias crimes, it fell short of modifying
the HCSA to mandate the collection of data on crimes motivated by gender. See id. The
Prevention Act finally clarified the federal mandate to add gender to the HCSA. See
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, § 4708, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012))
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Americans."192 At that time, Congress was focused on race, religion,
and ethnicity as the anchoring trio of federal hate crime laws.19s But
by the early 1990s, Congress began to specially consider gender in
the context of federal hate crime legislation. The first congressional
hearing on "Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violence
Against Women" was held in 1990, and a series of hearings took
place over the next three years. 194
These hearings ultimately culminated in the 1994 passage of the
Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA").195 Then-Senator Joseph
Biden, VAWA's principal sponsor, clearly pitched VAWA as federal
hate crime legislation directed at violent gender bias crimes.196 The
Act's central premise is that "[a]ll persons within the United States
shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender."197 It allocated over $1.6 billion to improve coordination
among communities, support organizations, law enforcement, and
the judicial system to better deal with crimes such as domestic
violence, rape, sexual assault, and stalking.198 VAWA addresses
gender bias crimes from the standpoint of prevention and
intervention, 199 and provides victims with civil remedies, including
compensatory and punitive damages.200
192. Jenness, supra note 22, at 561.
193. See id. (explaining that "race, religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation were
[already] inscribed into hate crime law" when gender was first mentioned).
194. Id. at 562 (reviewing "multiple hearings on the VAWA" from 1990-1993).
195. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13925-14045 (2012).
196. See Women and Violence, Hearing on Legislation to Reduce the Growing
Problem of Violent Crime Against Women Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 36 (1990) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) ("One of the things we are trying to
do in the Violence Against Women Act is to make it a policy of the country that rapes
are hate crimes committed against women, crimes of violence directed
disproportionately at one group based on their gender.").
197. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
198. See Pamela Bozeman-Evans, Violence Against Women Act, CHICAGO TRIBUNE
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-09/opinion/chi-violence-
against-women-act-20130109_1_vawa-violence-against-women-act-domestic-violence
(noting allocation of $1.6 billion toward crimes against women through the VAWA); 42
U.S.C. § 13925-14045 (noting the different categories where the funding may be used).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 14043c(c)(2) (providing for counseling programs and mental health
services); § 14043d-1 (preventing "crimes involving violence against women, children
and youth"; increasing availability of resources and services; mandating the
development and implementation of education and services programs, mandating
collaboration between community organizations and governmental agencies); § 10413
(mandating the establishment of a national twenty-four hour domestic violence
hotline); § 280b-lb(a)-(b) (providing for rape educational and prevention programs
including hotlines, and the dissemination of information).
200. § 13981(c) (providing victims the right to claim compensatory and punitive
damages). In a 5-4 decision, United States v. Morrison invalidated the civil remedy
provision on the grounds Congress lacked authority, under either the Commerce
Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact this section. 529 U.S. 598, 617, 626
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Despite the fact that VAWA is often described as "landmark"
legislation because it articulated the most sweeping legislative
response to gender crimes,201 congressional scrutiny was relatively
sedate at the time of passage. 202 In fact, VAWA's legislative record
was "largely uncontested":
Interestingly, the redefinition of gender violence required to
convert acts such as rape into hate crimes did not evoke much
debate, especially compared to the magnitude and intensity of
debates over the sexual orientation provision in the HCSA....
[S]ome hearings on the VAWA. . . featured no oppositional
testimony and the remaining [legislative history] ... manifest[s]
very little evidence of contestation over including the status of
"gender" in hate crime. 203
Most concerns expressed in the VAWA hearings related to
technical matters, such as the feasibility of collecting data on violent
crimes against women, which were generally accepted as
"pervasive."204 Indeed, Senator Biden noted the lack of opposition to
VAWA, stating that he was in the awkward and "unusual
position .. .of trying to build a case against [his] own bill"205 to flesh
out the congressional record.206
So the VAWA hearings were unlike congressional combat over
adding sexual orientation to the HCSA in at least two significant
respects: first, Congress did not question any evidence that gender is
vulnerable to bias crimes;207 second, outside advocates played a
minimal role in securing gender to federal hate crime legislation
through VAWA.208 Indeed, the "minimal resistance" to VAWA was
"easily addressed and subsequently dismissed by legislators without
the testimony of outside claimsmakers (i.e., representatives from
(2000). However, program funding remained unaffected. See id. at 598-666
(mentioning nothing indicating changes in the amount of funding allocated).
201. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, "No Civilized System of Justice" The Fate of the
Violence Against Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 504, 540 (2000) (calling VAWA "a
legal milestone").
202. Jenness, supra note 22, at 562-63.
203. Id. at 563.
204. Id. (discussing how testimony established the feasibility of such data
collection).
205. Id. at 564.
206. Predictably, the VAWA hearings repeated some of the rhetoric successfully
used by social movement organizations to justify the addition of sexual orientation to
the HCSA: VAWA hearings often analogized gender to other groups covered under
federal hate crime legislation, especially the anchoring trio of race, religion, and
ethnicity. Id. at 562-63.
207. See id. at 564.
208. Id. at 562 (noting that "support for [VAWA] was based less on direct pressure
from those engaging in collective action, and more on the previously established logic
used to justify" the inclusion of groups already covered in the HCSA and the
Sentencing Act).
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women's organizations)."209
But if gender-bias violence was so apparent in 1990, why did
Congress wait nineteen years before adding gender to the HCSA in
2009? Legislative history does not shed light on why gender was not
proposed as a candidate group for the HCSA before its enactment.210
But Congressional hearings on VAWA began around the same time
the HCSA was enacted;211 the contemporaneous evolution of VAWA
may have caused some confusion about whether and to what extent
the HCSA should also focus on data collection about gender bias
crimes.
In fact, some of the nation's premiere women's organizations had
not reached consensus about whether to lobby for gender to be added
to the HCSA.212 Some scholars point to conflicts among the very same
coalition that supported the bid to add sexual orientation, suggesting
that these organizations ultimately decided not to advocate for the
inclusion of gender at the same time.213 Still, others blame more
technical arguments distinguishing gender bias crimes from those
209. Id. at 563.
210. In fact, the only evidence that women's organizations participated in HCSA
hearings is limited to a short prepared statement from the National Organization for
Women, which was appended to the July 15, 1998 hearing on S. 2000. See Hate Crime
Statistics Act of 1988: Hearing on S. 2000 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 262-83 (1988) (statement of
Molly Yard, President, National Organization for Women). The statement suggested
that H.R. 3913 be amended to "include women." Id. Except for this submission, there is
no evidence that any other women's organization participated in congressional
hearings on the HCSA. The only other legislative record that suggests congressional
awareness of any interest in adding gender to the HCSA is a brief statement by one of
the key supporters of the HCSA, Representative Conyers. See 135 CONG. REC. 3179,
3187 ("I am aware that interest has been expressed in having crimes against women
and the elderly included in the bill, and perhaps through further congressional
hearings on hate crimes, a record can be created to support action in that regard by
the Attorney General.").
211. Jenness, supra note 22, at 562 (providing dates).
212. Fernandez, supra note 13, at 275.
213. Id. Fernandez explains the coalition's hesitancy this way:
Although some members . . . considered the idea of adding gender as a
counted category, eventually the coalition decided against this expansion.
Most groups believed that a hearing was needed to examine the deficiencies
in current gender-based crime data collection . . . and that to expand the
categories to include gender would not improve upon current data collection
on rape and domestic violence. Moreover, women's rights groups in
Washington could not agree on whether inclusion of gender in the Act was
the appropriate way to count gender-based crime. Given these difficulties,
the coalition decided to continue to work for the passage of the versions of
the bill [that did not include gender].
Id. See also Jenness, supra note 22, at 563 n.9 (offering similar reasons, but also
noting additional concerns "that including gender would open the door for age,
disability, position in a labor dispute, party affiliation, and/or membership in the
armed forces provisions").
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relating to race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation.214 For
example, some argued that most gender bias crimes appeared to
involve offenders who "were acquaintances of the victims."215
However, these accounts are vague and do not clearly attribute these
views to a particular speaker or time,216 So it is difficult to gauge any
potential impact of these arguments on Congressional decision-
making with respect to the HCSA.
A significant point is that none of these arguments suggest
Congress was reluctant to construct animus against women as social
pathology deserving of statutory redress. First, to the extent these
objections occurred in the midst of the enactment of the HCSA, they
would also occur simultaneously with the enactment of VAWA, a
landmark piece of legislation addressing gender bias crimes. Second,
even women's organizations were not in consensus about whether to
lobby for gender's inclusion in the HCSA. Third, the arguments
against adding gender to the HCSA did not feature most of the
indicators of Congressional resistance evident in the effort to add
sexual orientation: Congress did not require the presentation of
specific, compelling evidence of gender bias crimes before adding the
term to the HCSA; congressional records do not reveal significant
debate over any such proffered data, and certainly do not reveal
critiques of the data as inflated or inadequate; and congressional
records relating to the HCSA are devoid of any moral condemnation
of or negative associations with gender or women.
Although VAWA provided for federal collection of gender bias
crimes since 1990, by 2009, gender had unambiguously secured its
place in the HCSA through the enactment of the Prevention Act.217
Congressional debates over the Prevention Act barely feature any
discussion specifically related to gender.218 Gender identity, however,
was another matter.
E. Gender Identity (or Sexual Orientation, Redux)
Gender identity, also added to the HCSA through the enactment
of the Prevention Act in 2009,219 was a curious case; with a few
214. See, e.g., KROUSE, supra note 49, at 5 (citing JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY
POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS 72 (Oxford University
Press 1988)).
215. See id. at 5.
216. Id.
217. See Hate Crime Prevention Act of 2009 § 4702, Pub. L. No. 111-84 §§ 4701-
4713, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009).
218. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-147, at 8 (2002) (featuring approximately one page of
general, but positive discussion of gender as a candidate group).
219. §§ 4701-4713, 123 Stat. at 2835-44. Some of the first iterations of the
Prevention Act did not incorporate a reference to statistics or to the HCSA, but
contained specific congressional findings that "the incidence of violence motivated by
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notable exceptions, congressional debates generally did not target
gender identity. Instead, the proposal of the Prevention Act reignited
some pointed objections to covering sexual orientation; but this time,
objections were sporadic and comparatively muted. Perhaps the
decline was due to exhaustion from battle over sexual orientation
nearly two decades prior. Moreover, Congress debated the Prevention
Act on the heels of the Matthew Shepard murder, which focused
significant national attention on the grisly reality of anti-gay
violence;220 detractors may have thought it a poor time to go
overboard denying the problem of anti-gay bias crimes. The subdued
reaction to gender identity was also likely helped by congressional
confusion over the difference between sexual orientation and gender
identity. Put another way, debates over gender identity were likely
conflated with sexual orientation.221 Whatever the cause, the shift in
tenor from congressional debates over the addition of sexual
orientation in the late 1980s to that over gender identity in 2005-
2008 is undeniable.
Congressional debates over the Prevention Act waged for
approximately a decade;222 but the vast majority focused on the
the actual or perceived race, color, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, gender,
or disability of the victim poses a serious national problem." See Hate Crime
Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999). As a result, the Prevention Act
sought to expand federal jurisdiction over hate crimes by authorizing the Attorney
General to provide assistance to state investigations or prosecutions of bias crimes
under certain circumstances.
220. James Brooke, Gay Man Dies from Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998 at Al.
221. Congressional records tend to blur the lines between sexual orientation and
gender identity. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-147 (discussing sexual orientation under the
"gender" heading); Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 51-53 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1592]
(statement of Frederick Lawrence, Dean, George Washington University Law School)
(discussing sexual orientation and gender identity under the same heading, but mostly
specifically discussing sexual orientation); id. at 158-59 (statement of Christopher E.
Anders, Legislative Counsel, The American Civil Liberties Union) (purporting to
introduce examples of sexual orientation and gender identity bias, but categorizing all
examples as bias crimes on the basis of sexual orientation). By April 30, 2007,
congressional reports show some effort to distinguish between sexual orientation and
gender identity. See H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 12-13 (2007).
222. Representative Conyers first introduced the Prevention Act to the 106th
Congress in 1999 as part of that year's Department of Defense authorization bill. See
Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999). A precise recount
of each step in the Prevention Act's legislative history is beyond the scope of this
Article; instead, this Article focuses only on direct evidence of congressional decision-
making with respect to group coverage under the HCSA. For more exhaustive coverage
of congressional records relating to the Prevention Act, see, e.g., Kalam, supra note 18
(discussing the difficult history of getting the HCPA passed by Congress); Kim, supra
note 31 (analyzing the interplay between the legislative and judicial branches in using
the HCPA to combat crimes on the basis of sexual orientation).
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constitutionality of the Act, especially federalism223 and First
Amendment224 concerns. Because the Prevention Act permitted
federal involvement in state-level prosecutions of bias crimes,
debates also commonly tackled the proper scope of federal
jurisdiction and congressional regulatory authority.225 But, at least
with respect to the earliest iterations of the Prevention Act in 1999,
congressional debate over candidate groups may have been tempered
by the fact that the bills proposed only the groups already covered
under the HCSA or the Sentencing Act: race, religion, ethnicity,
sexual orientation, gender, and disability.226
Although a 2002 Senate Report referred to "antitransgender
incidents" of bias crimes under the heading of "sexual orientation,"227
gender identity was not specifically proposed for Prevention Act
coverage until May 26, 2005.228 H.R. 2662 was the first bill to include
gender identity, which it defined as "actual or perceived gender-
related characteristics."229 Although the Senate introduced a
223. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-147, at 10-14 (2002) (discussing federalism concerns).
224. See generally Carter T. Coker, Hope-Fulfilling or Effectively Chilling?
Reconciling the Hate Crimes Prevention Act with the First Amendment, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 271 (2011) (discussing First Amendment critiques of the HCPA); S. REP. NO. 107-
147, at 14-23 (discussing general concerns with the constitutionality of the Prevention
Act).
225. The provisions of the Prevention Act anticipate challenges to the proper scope
of congressional authority, animated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Morrison. 529 U.S. 588, 608-10 (2000) (holding the private cause of
action provision in VAWA unconstitutional because it exceeded Congressional power
under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment). Such concerns
were generally resolved by a Department of Justice letter opining that the Prevention
Act was constitutional. See June 13, 2000 letter from Assistant Attorney General
Robert Raben, available in S. REP. No. 107-147, at 16-23.
226. See, e.g., Hate Crime Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999).
227. S. REP. No. 107-147, at 6. The relative attention paid to Prevention Act
candidate groups is interesting and may reflect the level of opposition expected for
each group. Specific discussion of sexual orientation extends about one and a half
pages, with approximately one page devoted to reviewing statistics on the prevalence
of violence on the basis of sexual orientation and approximately four paragraphs
describing the Matthew Shepard case. Id. at 6-7. The discussion of gender extends
about one page, but does not cover any statistics on gender bias crimes; instead, the
discussion generally concerns VAWA. Id. at 7-8. The discussion of disability extends
about three paragraphs; like the treatment of gender, there is no discussion of
statistical evidence of bias crimes on the basis of disability; rather, the section
references Congress's "consistent and durable commitment over the past decade to the
protection of persons with disabilities from discrimination based on their disabilities."
Id. at 8. Later, the report provides seventeen examples of "Violent Hate Crimes Not
Covered By Existing Law": thirteen are categorized as anti-gay bias crimes, two are
categorized as transgender bias crimes, one is categorized as a gender bias crime, and
one is categorized as a disability bias crime. Id. at 26-30.
228. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 2662, 109th
Cong. (2005).
229. Id. at 14.
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companion bill on the same day, it did not include gender identity;230
in fact, the Senate did not include the term until nearly two years
later, when it introduced S. 1105 on April 12, 2007.231
Five days after the introduction of S. 1105, a series of
congressional hearings would be the first to explicitly reflect on the
propriety of the Prevention Act candidate groups. 232 Gender was
virtually absent from discussion,233 but conservatives refreshed
opposition to the protection of sexual orientation and, for the first
time, attacked the addition of gender identity.234 Representative
Louis Gohmert (R-TX) set the tone, offering one of the few jabs
specifically mentioning gender identity:
This hate crimes bill says to the world that sexual orientation-and
not just gender, but gender identity, whatever that vague definition
means-are in the same category as those persons who have
suffered for the color of their skin or their religion. It says to the
world that ... a transvestite with gender identity issues will now
be more important to protect than a heterosexual, than college or
school students, or even senior citizens and widows with no gender
identity issues. 235
Although gender identity was the only newcomer to federal hate
crime legislation, such general objections to its addition seem
relatively innocuous, particularly in contrast to the more pointed
attacks at sexual orientation. For example, despite a settled
definition of sexual orientation as consensual homosexual or
heterosexual conduct, opponents argued the term could be construed
to mean any sexual orientation, including pedophilia, necrophilia,
and bestiality.236 Representative Daniel E. Lungren (R-CA) expressed
230. Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2005, S. 1145,
109th Cong. (2005).
231. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crime Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th
Cong. (2007).
232. Hearing on H.R. 1592, supra note 221; H.R. REP. No. 110-113 (2007); Local
Law Enforcement Hate Crime Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007).
The April 17 hearing occurred the day after the notorious campus shootings at
Virginia Tech. Some members of Congress used the tragedy to bolster their opposition
to the Prevention Act. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1592, supra note 221, at 2-4
(statement of Rep. Gohmert) ("This hate crime legislation ... tells the country that
victims like those young people yesterday, if they are killed randomly, they are not
nearly as important to the country as transvestites with gender issues.").
233. Any discussion of gender was not only limited and general, but could be fairly
described as supportive or at least neutral. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1592, supra note
221, at 50-51 (statement of Dean Lawrence); id. at 114-15 (question and answer
between Mr. Nadler and Dean Jack McDevitt).
234. Hearing on H.R. 1592, supra note 221, at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Gohmert).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 3 ("[S]exual orientation one of these days will be taken to mean those
very words that includes you are sexually oriented toward children, sexually oriented
toward corpses, sexually oriented toward animals.").
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particular concern that the term "sexual orientation" would be
exploited by organizations such as the North American Man/Boy
Love Association (NAMBLA):
NAMBLA, instead of hiding, proudly proclaims their position of
"sexual orientation." They argue, for instance, that we are denying
children their right to have sexual expression with adults and that
somehow we are hampering their development .... I am not
making this up, my colleagues. This is a fact. And under a non-
defined term of "sexual orientation," that very well may be
included.237
Such efforts to associate sexual orientation with criminal and
morally repugnant behavior harkened back to discursive tactics from
the HCSA debates in the late 1980s. 238 And yet, in 2007, opponents
appeared to engage in these tactics less frequently and with
somewhat less enthusiasm.239 But opponents did not completely give
up: they assembled an arsenal of poison pills designed to derail the
bill; these were defeated, although sometimes narrowly.240
Predictably, a few opponents explicitly proposed to remove sexual
orientation and gender identity from the Prevention Act; these
proposals were also defeated, but by relatively close margins.241
Perhaps sensing a slightly depressed appetite for battle, few
advocates shined a spotlight on sexual orientation or gender identity;
instead, they tended to advocate more broadly for the passage of the
Prevention Act and all of its candidate groups. 242 For example,
237. 153 CONG. REC. 11,159(2007) (statement of Rep. Daniel Lungren).
238. See supra pp. 573-75, 592 (discussing the indicators of heightened
congressional resistance to a candidate group).
239. Emblematic of much of the congressional debate over the Prevention Act, the
Dissenting View in the April 30, 2007 House Report briefly and wearily objects to the
coverage of sexual orientation and gender identity, but mostly it concentrates on more
general objections to the Prevention Act. Hearing on H.R. 1592, supra note 221, at 39-
49.
240. Most of these poison pills proposed to add new members to the list of covered
groups, including members of the military. H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 20 (2007)
(introduced by Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA), defeated 16 to 2); see also id. at 23 ("senior
citizens"); id. at 24 ("pregnant women") (introduced by Rep. Robert Goodlatte (R-VA),
defeated 16 to 12); id. (witnesses in a judicial proceeding) (introduced by Rep.
Goodlatte, defeated 16 to 15); id. at 25 ("animus associated with the victim's status as
a victim of a prior crime") (introduced by Rep. Steven Chabot (R-OH), defeated 20 to
15); id. at 28 (children under 18) (introduced by Rep. Forbes, defeated 21 to 16). Some
of the proposed amendments were particularly cheeky; for example, one challenged the
constitutionality of the Prevention Act under the First Amendment, proposing "to
change the name of the Act to the 'Local Law Enforcement Thought Crimes Prevention
Act of 2007." Id. at 29 (introduced by Rep. Steve King, defeated 21 to 13).
Representative King explained the Orwellian basis for his proposed amendment at
H4436.
241. H.R. REP. No. 110-113, at 20 (2007) (introduced by Rep. Gohmert, defeated 18
to 13); id. at 28 (introduced by Rep. Steven King, defeated 20 to 15).
242. Most statements in support of sexual orientation or gender identity were fairly
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proponents generally challenged the presence of intolerance in
Congress. Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD) used racial bias to
illustrate how the recognition of congressional prejudice can be
constrained by the passage of time:
[I]n times past, [members of Congress] rose on this floor and
rationalized slavery and rationalized why we should not have
antilynching laws in America.... We lament it, and we say to
ourselves, had we lived in those times . .. hopefully we would have
been beyond our time .... We serve now in the 21st century, and
we know that there are those ... who preach hate against a class of
people not because of their actions, not because of their character,
but because of who they are. That is what this vote is about
today. 243
The passage of nearly twenty years since the HCSA debates
certainly seemed to make a difference in the overall tenor of
congressional debates over the Prevention Act: even with the
addition of gender identity, the bill passed the Senate.244 But the
victory was short-lived: President George W. Bush threatened to
veto the entire Defense authorization bill if the Prevention Act was
attached.245 A release from the Executive Office of the President
expressed support for "strong criminal penalties for violent crime,
including crime based on personal characteristics such as race, color,
religion, or national origin," but the release did not mention sexual
orientation or gender identity.246 Instead, White House Spokesperson
Tony Fratto clarified that the veto related to the sexual orientation
provisions.247 Ultimately, the President's objection to the Prevention
general and brief. Representative Jan Schakowsky's (D-IL) statement is illustrative:
"This is not about thought. This is not about speech. This is about violence. And you or
your pastor may not agree with homosexuals or transgenders, but surely you don't
think that is a reason for them to be assaulted." 135 CONG. REC. 11,176 (2007).
Proponents' relatively relaxed posture was particularly evident with respect to gender
identity. For example, at the April 17, 2007 hearing, the most pointed discussion
relating to gender identity was a brief question and answer between then-
Representative Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) and Dean Jack McDevitt over the prevalence
of violence motivated by anti-transgender bias. Hearing on H.R. 1592, supra note 221,
at 130. Dean McDevitt pointed to data suggesting that "30 to 40 percent of individuals
who are transgender or have gender identification issues, but those data are all
tainted by the fact they are collected by advocacy groups. If the FBI were to collect
them, then we would be in a much better place of having more reliable data." Id.
(statement of Dean Jack McDevitt, Associate Dean for research and graduate studies,
Northeastern University School of Criminology and Criminal Justice).
243. 135 CONG. REC. 11,177 (2007).
244. The House passed the bill, 237-180. 135 CONG. REC. 11,188 (2007).
245. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R.
1592: LOCAL LAw ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT OF 2007 (May 3,
2007), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hrl592sap-h.pdf.
246. Id.
247. See Editorial, Bush Vows to Veto Hate-Crime Expansion for Gays, WASH. TIMES
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Act as "unnecessary and constitutionally questionable"248 was
celebrated by conservative groups. 249
The threat of a presidential veto iced the Prevention Act until
Representative Conyers and Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) re-
introduced it under the Obama Administration in April 2009.250 The
April 27, 2009 House Report on H.R. 1913 signaled a gradual shift in
congressional attitudes toward sexual orientation and gender
identity.251 The report cribbed heavily from a preceding report's
section entitled, "Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender,
Gender Identity, or Disability."252 This section pointed to "an
emerging consensus" that these groups were worthy of hate crime
protection, specifically noting that sexual orientation, gender, and
disability had been enumerated as protected groups in the 1994
Sentencing Act.253 Although gender identity had not been covered in
the Sentencing Act, the section noted that "since 1994, gender
identity has been added to numerous State and local hate crimes
statutes based on the same understanding of the corrosive effects of
bias-motivated violence, and in recognition of the fact that this
particular bias has been behind particularly violent assaults."254 The
section also separately, but briefly, presented the case for extending
federal jurisdiction to cover each candidate group, including gender
identity.255 The report conceded there were "no federally compiled
statistics" on anti-transgender bias crimes, but it offered data from
advocacy groups reporting "that over 400 people have been murdered
due to anti-transgender bias since 1999."256 Further, the report noted
(Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.washingtontimes.cominews/2007/aug/07/bush-vows-to-veto-
hate-crime-expansion-for-gays/.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., President Bush Vows to Veto "Hate Crimes" Bill-Or Does He?,
FAMILY POLIcY NETWORK (July 17, 2007), http://familypolicy.net/us/nation/?p=3.
250. H.R. REP. No. 111-86 (2009).
251. Id.
252. Compare id. at 9-12, with Hearing on H.R. 1592, supra note 221, at 10-13.
253. H.R. REP. NO. 111-86, at 9.
254. Id. at 9-10.
255. Id. The attention paid to each group is revealing. The case for sexual
orientation is approximately one page long. Id. (discussing FBI statistics of anti-gay
bias crimes and the Matthew Shepard case); gender identity is also approximately one
page, id. at 10-11 (discussed in the accompanying text); gender is approximately a half
page, id. at 11 (discussing VAWA and observing that "[a]lthough all 50 States have
statutes prohibiting rape and other crimes typically committed against women, only
28, plus the District of Columbia, have hate crimes statutes that include gender"); and
disability is approximately a third of a page long, id. at 12 (discussing the ADA and
observing that "24 States plus the District of Columbia" include disability in hate
crime legislation). Although statistical evidence of vulnerability to bias crimes is only
briefly reviewed for sexual orientation and gender identity, the report does not
mention statistical evidence of gender-bias or disability-bias crimes.
256. Id. at 11.
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that in the prior calendar year "of 2008 alone, there were 21 murders
of transgender and gender non-conforming people."257 Another
paragraph discussed the Brandon Teena murder, "dramatized in the
movie 'Boys Don't Cry."'258 Finally, the section set forth additional
measures of support for transgender bias crime protection, including
the fact that 13 states included hate crime protections for
transgender individuals, "13 states and 93 localities" covered
transgendered individuals in anti-discrimination laws, and a 2002
Human Rights Campaign foundation survey indicated that 68% of
Americans supported the inclusion of transgendered individuals in
federal hate crime legislation.259 Within six months of this report, the
Prevention Act again passed both chambers of Congress and was
signed into law by President Obama on October 28, 2009.260
Even as the newcomer to federal hate crime legislation, gender
identity escaped significant congressional scrutiny-both because of
and in spite of the fact that it was closely associated with sexual
orientation. Although the blurring of sexual orientation and gender
identity likely created some confusion, this blurring also likely
benefitted the bid to add gender identity to the Prevention Act. First,
to some degree, gender identity rode on the coattails of sexual
orientation, which had already run the gauntlet to coverage under
the HCSA. Second, although Congress never held a hearing
specifically focused on anti-transgender bias, anti-transgender bias
crime data appeared to be subsumed in data relating to anti-gay bias
crimes. Finally, sexual orientation and gender identity could draw
from the same well of organizational support, which had grown
considerably in the 20 year span between the HCSA and the
Prevention Act, and which was vital to the successful enactment of
both laws.261
Of course, the successful addition of any candidate group to
federal hate crime legislation does not resolve the problem of deeply
rooted bias against it.262 In January of 2010, the Prevention Act
257. Id.
258. Id. at 12.
259. Id.
260. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009).
261. The Prevention Act enjoyed "the support of more than 210 civil rights,
.education, religious, and civic organizations" and the support of "the law enforcement
community," including 31 state attorneys general. 153 CONG. REC.11,154 (2007)
(statement of Rep. James McGovern (D-MA)). See also Jenness, supra note 22, at 566
(explaining the vital role of organizational support for the bid to add sexual orientation
to the HCSA).
262. See, e.g., Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The
Struggle To Achieve Judicial And Legislative Equality For Transgender People, 7 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 39-40 (2000) ("For the most part, transgender people have
not been excluded from civil rights protections because of conceptual or philosophical
failures in legal reasoning, but rather because they have not been viewed as worthy of
[Vol. 66:3606
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received the dubious honor of being named the "number one anti-
Christian Act of 2009 by the Christian Anti-Defamation League"
because the Act covered sexual orientation and gender identity.263
Still, the Prevention Act was the last tool successfully used to expand
the list of groups covered under the HCSA.
F. Summary of Observations
More than two decades of debates over the propriety of HCSA-
covered groups suggest that Congress applies a higher level of
scrutiny to "unpopular" candidate groups-those that are subject to
prejudice that is not recognized as social pathology at the time they
are assessed for coverage. Compared to race, religion, ethnicity,
disability, and gender, the bid to cover sexual orientation generated
the most sustained and fervent congressional resistance. A
comparative study of legislative history reveals four common
indicators of heightened congressional resistance to a candidate
group, including (1) an apparent requirement that the candidate
group present compelling evidence of its vulnerability to bias crimes;
(2) a tendency to critique the candidates' proffered data as inflated or
inadequate; (3) moral condemnation of the candidate group,
including the portrayal of the candidates as criminals or perpetrators
of violence; and (4) to a lesser extent, technical arguments, such as
objections to definitions of the candidate group as vague or over-
inclusive. These indicators were not evident in the decisions to
provide HCSA coverage for race, religion, ethnicity, and disability.
Although Congress may have been aware of some technical
arguments regarding the addition of gender to the HCSA in 1990, it
contemporaneously made gender-bias crimes the focus of VAWA, and
later added gender to the HCSA without significant debate. Gender
identity appeared to dodge some of the intense attacks characteristic
of congressional debates over sexual orientation in the late 1980s;
however, resistance to gender identity was likely conflated with the
renewed, but slightly dampened, opposition to sexual orientation at
the beginning of the 21st century.
Legislative history also reveals helpful commentary on the
dynamics of bias, which can be understood not only in terms of the
protection or, in some cases, even as human."). Several complaints challenging the
constitutionality of the HCSA illustrate this homophobic and transphobic reasoning.
See About the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of
2009, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/crm/matthewshepard.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2014)
(linking to "recent opinions addressing constitutional challenges" to the Prevention
Act).
263. Pete Winn, Hate-Crimes Law Named No.1 Anti-Christian Act of 2009,




product of hate crime legislation, but also in terms of the process of
crafting hate crime legislation. For example, debates over the
inclusion of sexual orientation in the HCSA often focused on how
political power and representation can influence the perceived social
acceptability of a candidate group. 264 If a group is perceived as
socially acceptable or relatively integrated into mainstream society,
Congress is more likely to construct animus against that group as
pathological, and therefore, deserving of statutory protection.265 The
irony, of course, is that less socially acceptable groups are more likely
to be marginalized and subject to discrimination and prejudice, but
in turn, that prejudice is less likely to be construed as morally or
legally wrong. This tendency was illustrated in conservative
tendencies to reject or ignore credible evidence of anti-gay violence.
Strong support from a broad range of social movement
organizations was crucial to the successful addition of sexual
orientation and gender identity in federal hate crime legislation.266
Indeed, effective advocacy and organization has resulted in
increasing societal acceptance of LGBTQ rights, which at the time of
this writing, is most recently exemplified in the United States
Supreme Court's United States v. Windsor decision, which ruled the
Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional.267 The remarkable
shift from the BowerS268 decision in 1986 to the Windsor decision in
2013 speaks not only to the potency of LGBTQ social movement
organizations, but it also reflects a corresponding shift in the
perceived social acceptability of LGBTQ rights.269 Political
representation continues to be significant for the LGBTQ
community.270 Mainstream visibility of LGBTQ individuals is also
increasing, leading to what has sometimes been referred to as the six
264. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.
265. Id.
266. See Jenness, supra note 22, at 550 (discussing the role of "social movement
organizations" in securing hate crime coverage).
267. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
268. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
269. A recent Washington Post-ABC News poll shows that the majority of
Americans approved of both the Windsor decision to strike down DOMA and the
return of marriage equality to California. Post-ABC Poll: Impression of Supreme
Court's Decisions on Gay Marriage and Voting Rights, WASH. POST (July 3, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/polling/postabc-poll-impression-supreme-
courts-decisions/2013/07/03/4cb57d98-e3cf-11e2-bffd-37a36ddab820_page.html.
270. According to some sources, the vast majority of states have openly gay or
lesbian public officials. See Paul Canning, 48 States Now Have Openly Gay Politicians,
CARE2.COM (Jan. 3, 2012, 7:30 PM),_http://www.care2.com/causes/48-states-now-have-
openly-gay-politicians.html; see also Find a Leader, GAY & LESBIAN VICTORY INST.,




degrees of separation phenomenon.271 As a result, prejudice against
LGBTQ individuals is increasingly recognized as pathological; both
Congress and the courts today are more likely to construe animus
against LGBTQ individuals as wrong when compared to twenty years
ago. 272 These developments suggest that sexual orientation and
gender identity are secure as firmaments in federal hate crime
legislation.273
But since 2009 and to this day, another vulnerable group
continues to struggle for recognition and protection under federal
hate crime laws: the homeless.274 As explained below, like the
congressional debates over sexual orientation, legislative history
regarding the bid to add homelessness to the HCSA reveals all of the
indicators of heightened congressional resistance.275 Like the LGBTQ
community in 1990, available data and common sense shows the
homeless are vulnerable to violent bias crimes; however, because the
homeless are regarded as socially unacceptable, Congress appears to
regard animus against the homeless as normal or justified to some
degree.276 Even more unfortunate is that the homeless are missing
the most potent arrows in their quiver-those held by the LGBTQ
community: effective organization, political representation, and
mainstream visibility.277 Even though comparisons between the
homeless and currently covered groups suggests that the homeless
are similarly deserving of HCSA coverage, today the homeless are
more vulnerable to "unrecognized" congressional prejudice against
them.278
III. EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL BIAS WITH RESPECT TO THE SOLE
271. See Lymari Morales, Knowing Someone Gay/Lesbian Affects Views of Gay
Issues, GALLUP (May 29, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/118931/Knowing-Someone-
Gay-Lesbian-Affects-Views-Gay-Issues.aspx (discussing results of USA Today-Gallup
poll and reporting "that, when controlling for ideology, those who know someone who
is gay or lesbian are significantly more supportive of gay marriage than are those of
the same political persuasion who do not personally know someone who is gay or
lesbian"); Bruce Drake, As More Americans Have Contacts with Gays and Lesbians,
Social Acceptance Rises, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 8, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/18/as-more-americans-have-contacts-
with-gays-and-lesbians-social-acceptance-rises/ (discussing results of Pew Research
Center surveys showing relationship between personal contact with and perceived
social acceptability of LGBTQ individuals).
272. Compare, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192, with Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
273. See Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra note 8, at 671 (determining that
Congress seems to have settled on sexual orientation as a member of federal hate
crime legislation).
274. See infra Part III.
275. See infra Part III.A.
276. See infra Part III.
277. See infra Part III.
278. See infra Part III. A.
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NEW CANDIDATE GROUP: THE HOMELESS
The homeless are the only candidate group that has received a
congressional hearing, but has yet to be admitted to the HCSA.279
The push began on May 8, 2007, when Representative Eddie Bernice
Johnson (D-TX) first introduced a bill proposing to amend the HCSA
to add the homeless.28o The bill, H.R. 2216, was referred to the House
of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary and died there
without debate.281 Hoping for a different outcome two years later, on
July 30, 2009, Johnson re-introduced the bill as H.R. 3419, again in
the House of Representatives.282 Although Johnson gained more co-
sponsors for the bill, like its predecessor, H.R. 3419 died without a
hearing.283
That fall, on October 8, 2009, Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)
introduced S. 1765, a bill virtually identical to those previously
sponsored by Representative Johnson.284 Senate Bill 1765 was
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and for the first
time, a hearing was held on the bill.285 But the excitement was short-
lived; S. 1765 also died in Committee.286
After the Senate hearings on S. 1765, the bill languished despite
significant congressional sponsorship and advocacy group support.287
Members of Congress reintroduced the bill in in November 2011288
279. See infra Part III.
280. Hate Crimes Against the Homeless Statistics Act of 2007, H.R. 2216, 110th
Cong. (2007). The bill attracted 20 co-sponsors. Id.
281. See H.R. 2216 (110th) Hate Crimes Against the Homeless Statistics Act of 2007,
GOVTRACK.Us, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr2216 (last visited Apr. 16,
2014).
282. Hate Crimes Against the Homeless Statistics Act of 2009, H.R. 3419, 111th
Cong. (2009). Although the total number of co-sponsors dropped to 13, several
representatives repeated their co-sponsorship. See id.
283. See H.R. 3419 (111th): Hate Crimes Against the Homeless Statistics Act of 2009,
GOVTRACK.Us, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3419 (last visited Apr. 16,
2014) [hereinafter H.R. 3419, GOVTRACK.US).
284. Hate Crimes Against the Homeless Statistics Act of 2009, S. 1765, 110th Cong.
(2009). The bill was initially introduced by Senator Cardin with co-sponsors Senator
Susan Collins (R-ME), Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Senator Mikulski, Senator
Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), and Senator Roland
Burris (D-IL). Id. Before the bill died in committee, it grew to 11 co-sponsors. Overview
of S. 1765 (111th): Hate Crimes Against the Homeless Statistics Act of 2009,
GOVTRACK.Us, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s1765#overview (last visited
Apr. 16, 2014) [hereinafter S. 1765, GOVTRACK.US].
285. Crimes Against America's Homeless: Is the Violence Growing?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. S.
111-915, (2010) [hereinafter Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless].
286. See supra note 283.
287. See supra note 284.
288. On November 30, 2011, Congresswoman Johnson (D-TX) and 5 co-sponsors re-
introduced the bill as H.R. 3528 in the House of Representatives. Hate Crimes Against
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and again in March of 2013,289 but neither bill went to a hearing. As
a result, the hearing on Senate Bill 1765 is the only documented
glimpse into congressional deliberations regarding the inclusion or
exclusion of the homeless into federal hate crime legislation.
A. The Congressional Hearing on the Homeless: Familiar
Problems
At the Senate Bill 1765 hearing, advocates for the homeless
advanced arguments and proffered evidence similar to that offered by
successful target groups. Opponents articulated arguments similar to
those against the addition of sexual orientation. So the key question
of whether Congress would treat homelessness differently than the
various groups already covered under the HCSA took center stage.
The hearing, titled Crimes Against America's Homeless: Is the
Violence Growing?, was conducted before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs on September 29,
2010.290 Senator Cardin, the bill's primary sponsor, moderated the
presentations given by advocates for and against the inclusion of the
homeless in the HCSA. Several representatives testified in support of
the bill, including Congresswoman Johnson; Professor Brian Levin,
from California State University's Center for the Study of Hate &
Extremism;291 Richard Wierzbicki, Commander of the Hate Crimes-
Anti-Bias Task Force for the Broward County Florida Sheriffs Office;
and Simone Manning-Moon, the sister of homeless murder victim,
Norris Gaynor.292 Unlike LGBTQ advocates, homeless advocates
the Homeless Statistics Act of 2011, H.R. 3528, 112th Cong. (2011). H.R. 3528 was
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and, aside from picking up 17
additional co-sponsors for a total of 22 co-sponsors, no further developments were
reported before the bill died in Committee. H.R. 3528 (112th): Hate Crimes Against the
Homeless Statistics Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 12/hr3528 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
289. H.R. 1136, the Violence Against the Homeless Accountability Act of 2013, was
introduced by Congresswoman Johnson on Mar 13, 2013. Violence Against the
Homeless Accountability Act of 2013, H.R. 1136, 113th Cong. (2013). This bill has 14
co-sponsors and has been referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
Homeland Security, and Investigations. See H.R. 1136: Violence Against the Homeless
Accountability Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1136 (last visited Apr. 16,2014).
290. Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285.
291. The website for the Center for the Study of Hate & Extremism states that it is
a nonpartisan research and policy center that examines the ways that [bligotry ...
den[ies] civil or [h]uman [r]ights to people on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion,
gender, sexual orientation, disability or other relevant status characteristic. The
center seeks to aid . . . others with objective information to aid them in their
examination and implementation of law, education and policy." Center for the Study of
Hate & Extremism, About Us, CAL. STATE UNIV. SAN BERNADINO,
http://hatemonitor.csusb.edulaboutUs/index.htm (last updated Jan. 7, 2014).
292. See Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at III.
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were not as successful at organizing a broad range of social
movement organizations and law enforcement agencies to testify at
the hearing. Still, both the National Coalition for the Homeless
(NCH) and the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty
submitted written data and testimony, while approximately 150
organizations submitted a letter of support for Senate Bill 1765.293
Senator Cardin dispensed with general objections to hate crime
legislation at the outset, stating: "[T]hat debate has been one that we
have had in Congress .... [A]nd the majority in Congress passed the
hate crimes, signed into law . . . . [But] that is not the debate
today."294 Some opponents insisted on general challenges to the
statistical validity or constitutionality of federal hate crime
legislation.295 In response, Senator Cardin acknowledged the
limitations of the HCSA, but stated that the opponents' arguments
reminded him "of people who complain that we should not try to stop
wars because we cannot stop all wars or we should not fight for
human rights because we cannot end all human rights abuses. I
mean, you make progress where you can make progress."296 Instead,
Senator Cardin advocated for a pragmatic approach, describing the
HCSA as "not perfect, but it is certainly the best we have."297 In other
words, Senator Cardin argued, part of the justification for coverage
under the HCSA is to seek a more uniform set of data, one that could
create a clearer picture of a group's vulnerability to bias-motivated
violence.298 The data the HCSA generates would still help law
enforcement and community organizations better understand bias
crimes and to fashion more effective responses. 299
293. Id. at 170 (statement of the National Coalition for the Homeless); see also id. at
149-55 (expressing support for S. 1765 in the "Miscellaneous Coalition Letter" to
Senator Cardin).
294. Id. at 15-16 (statement of Sen. Cardin).
295. Id. at 10-12, 132-36 (statement of Professor Erik Luna, Washington and Lee
School of Law); see also id. at 156-64 (statement of David B. Muhlhausen, Research
Fellow, The Heritage Foundation). The accuracy of the HCSA has also been challenged
by legal scholars. Compare William B. Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S. Hate Crimes
Statistics: An Empirical Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1213 (2004) (providing a critical
assessment of the statistical accuracy of the HCSA), with LAWRENCE, supra note 2, at
23 (discussing multiple factors that lead to underreporting of hate crimes).
Significantly, the critique that the HCSA is an imperfect statistical reporting tool has
never, on its own, prevented the inclusion of a group under the HCSA.
296. Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at 18
(statement of Sen. Cardin).
297. Id. at 17.
298. See Fernandez, supra note 13, at 263 (discussing this rationale in the context
of efforts to add sexual orientation to the HCSA).
299. See Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at 13
(statement of Richard Wierzbicki, Commander, Hate Crimes/Anti-Bias Task Force,
Broward County Florida Sheriffs Office) (praising the HCSA as a helpful tool for law
enforcement). Indeed, even Professor Luna's written testimony concedes as much:
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Setting aside such general objections to the validity and utility of
hate crime legislation, the battle ultimately centered on the
credibility and sufficiency of proof that the homeless are subject to
violent, bias-motivated crimes. NCH proffered approximately ten
years of reports detailing such statistical and anecdotal evidence,300
including a 2009 report completed shortly before the congressional
hearing.301 The NCH data, along with other data "from the United
States and Canada show[ed] a disturbing consistency regarding the
prevalence of . .. brutal victimizations" of the homeless.302 "The
studies and surveys repeatedly indicate an annual risk of criminal
victimization as high as 66% to 82%, about the highest for any
subgroup in the industrialized world."303 The data also suggested
that more than 240 homeless men and women were killed in hate
crime violence nationwide "over the past decade."304 These hate
crimes revealed a trend "of severe overkill. Methods include blunt
force trauma, shootings, maiming, drowning, stabbings, and the
burning of victims alive."305 Indeed, advocates determined "that there
were well over twice as many homeless people killed in apparent bias
related attacks than the combined total number of deaths for every
other 'official' hate crime category reported by the [FBI] in the last
decade."306 Moreover, data showed the trend of violence against the
homeless was also increasing, even as the overall violent crime and
homicide rates were decreasing nationwide.307
Like proponents of the bid to add sexual orientation to the
"mhe inherent limitations of these statistics are-or should be-understood and
acknowledged by policymakers; and as long as any errors in classification are random,
the data provided under the Hate Crime Statistics Act might still give a reasonable
overall picture with all the caveats attached." Id. at 11 (statement of Professor Luna).
300. See id. at 167-229 (statement of National Coalition for the Homeless); see also
Homeless Hate Crimes Legislation, NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS,
http://nationalhomeless.org/advocacy/homelesshate_crimes.html (last modified July
30, 2013) (linking to reports).
301. Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at 169
(statement of National Coalition for the Homeless) (thanking Senator Cardin for
introducing the report into the record).
302. Id. at 56 (statement of Professor Brian H. Levin, California State University).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 57.
305. Id.
306. Id. ("From 1999-2008 (the last year with available FBI data) 245 homeless
people were killed in apparent hate homicides versus 103 for all the hate crime
homicides for race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin and disability
combined.").
307. Id. at 57-58 ("In 2009 alone in the United States, at least 43 homeless people
were killed in hate attacks-the highest since 2001, when 43 people were also killed.
2009 was the fourth increase in five years. This increase, while based on admittedly
small numbers, nonetheless comes at a time when overall violent crime and homicide
are on a multi-year decline, with criminal homicide down a full 9% from 2005.").
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HCSA, homeless advocates reviewed pervasive and disturbing
evidence of mainstream bias against the homeless.308 For example,
advocates argued that popular media depicts the "homeless as
disposable people": a recent issue of Maxim magazine suggested to its
readers: "Kill one for fun. We're 87 percent sure it's legal."0so
Similarly, popular fight videos and viral hits such as "Bumfights"
feature "fights between homeless men plied by the producers with
alcohol, as well as sadistic assaults where terrified sleeping homeless
people are startled awake and bound with duct tape."31o Proponents
gave numerous other examples of how popular culture glorifies
violence against the homeless and promotes anti-homeless
sentiment.311
Much like opponents of the bid to add sexual orientation to the
HCSA, opponents of the homeless bid questioned the credibility and
sufficiency of evidence submitted by advocates. David Muhlhausen, a
research fellow at the Heritage Foundation,312 charged that
the NCH report uses a highly questionable methodology for
estimating crimes against the homeless. Using a variety of sources,
the cases of violence against the homeless identified in the NCH
report appear to be primarily collected from media reports and
homeless advocates.313
Similar to claims that sexual orientation advocates were
"inflating" or "manufacturing" their data, Professor Erik Luna, an
adjunct fellow at the Cato Institute,314 challenged the legitimacy of
308. See id. at 60.
309. Id.; see also id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Cardin).
310. Id. at 60 (statement of Professor Levin).
311. Id. at 57; see also id. at 171-229 (statement of the National Coalition for the
Homeless).
312. The Heritage Foundation's website states that it is "a research and educational
institution-a think tank-whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative
public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government,
individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense." About
Heritage, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, http://www.heritage.org/about (last visited Apr.
16, 2014).
313. Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at 158
(statement of David B. Muhlhausen).
314. The Cato Institute's website uses very similar language to the Heritage
Foundation website. It states that "[t]he Cato Institute is a public policy research
organization-a think tank-dedicated to the principles of individual liberty, limited
government, free markets and peace. Its scholars and analysts conduct independent,
nonpartisan research on a wide range of policy issues." About Cato, CATO INSTITUTE,
http://www.cato.org/about (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). Professor Luna's written
testimony objected to hate crime legislation generally, and specifically rejected the
validity of the statistical data proffered by homeless advocates. See Hearing on Crimes
Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at 131-45. But at the Senate hearing,
Professor Luna's oral testimony was more qualified: he restated his general objections
to hate crime legislation; however, he stated that he had no objection to the passage of
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data showing that violent bias crimes are committed against the
homeless:
[T]o be blunt, integrity and consistency in empirical claims have
not been a strong suit for some advocates and scholars, who can
claim that hate crimes are either an "epidemic" or "rare" depending
on the demands of their audience. . . . Unfortunately, some of these
problems appear to exist in the NCH's reports on hate crimes
against the homeless. 315
Instead, Professor Luna preferred that homeless advocacy
groups like the NCH-an organization that is typically staffed by an
average of four full time employeessls-use the same "type of
standards in reporting and identifying crimes that are utilized by the
FBI."317 As an alternative, Professor Luna suggested, NCH should be
required to provide sufficient proof that each reported incident of
violent crime against the homeless amounted to a bias crime.318
Otherwise, Congress could not be sure that the NCH reports were
anything more than "speculation."319
Proponents rejected the notion that such a heightened level of
proof was required before Congress could take note of the problem of
hate crimes committed against the homeless. Similar to positions
taken by LGBTQ advocates, homeless advocates acknowledged the
limitations of their data,320 but argued "in the same way a smoke
alarm sends out a credible message that something is wrong, . . . we
have enough data to indicate that there is an additional problem."321
Law enforcement testimony also corroborated the legitimacy and
sufficiency of homeless advocates' data.322 Moreover, proponents
stressed that the available data likely undercounted the incidence of
bias crimes committed against the homeless, who suffer from "fear of
Senate Bill 1765 to allow for the compilation of uniform statistical data documenting
violence against the homeless. See id. at 17 ("I have absolutely nothing against this bill
itself... . I totally agree that it is a good thing to have [uniform statistical data]."); see
also id. at 31 (stating "the [data collection] approach taken pursuant to the Hate
Crime Statistics Act does not seem inherently unreasonable to me.").
315. Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at 135.
316. E-mail from Michael Stoops, Director of Community Organizing, National
Coalition of the Homeless, to author (Aug. 4, 2013) (on file with author).
317. Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at 17.
318. See id. at 135-38 (written testimony of Professor Luna).
319. Id. at 136.
320. Professor Levin acknowledged "the paucity of cases coupled with the
incomplete nature of secondary and indirect reporting methods and sources limits the
utility of the data, particularly in the area of annual trend analysis." Id. at 58. He also
pointed out "significant limitations that include unofficial sources, a low base of cases,
and a high beta." Id. at 59.
321. Id. at 20.
322. See id. at 238 (written testimony of Richard Wierzbicki, Commander, Hate
Crimes/Anti-Bias Task Force, Broward County Florida Sheriffs Office).
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police, fear of retaliation, disability, and more limited access to tools
like cars and telephones that aid reporting."323
Undaunted, opponents suggested that violent crimes against the
homeless were unworthy of special attention. For example,
Muhlhausen suggested that the proper measure was to focus on
homicide, specifically to compare the number of murders of homeless
people to the total number of murders nationwide.324 This
comparison showed that in 2009, there were 15,241 homicides in the
entire United States, but only 43 of those murdered were
homeless.325 Therefore, Muhlhausen maintained, the total number of
homeless people murdered was "tiny" and did not rise to the level of
congressional concern.326 Muhlhausen recounted data showing that
the murder rate for the homeless (6.7 incidents per 100,000 homeless
persons in 2009) was higher than the national murder rate (5.0
incidents per 100,000 residents); however, this data could also be
discounted: "While the homeless murder rate is higher than the
national rate, the difference is neither startling nor a justification for
the Federal Government to begin formally collecting statistics on
these crimes."327
Moreover, Muhlhausen suggested, the homeless are unworthy of
congressional attention because they tend to be criminals.328 Like the
homophobic rhetoric evident in congressional hearings over the
addition of sexual orientation to the HCSA, Muhlhausen urged
Congress to discount evidence of violent crimes committed against
the homeless because "[tihe homeless commit too many violent and
property crimes. . . . [They] are generally not a collection of law
abiding individuals."29 Such claims invoke a familiar script from
opponents of the bid to add sexual orientation to the HCSA: Congress
should be protecting society against the homeless instead of
construing the homeless as worthy of protection.330
323. Id. at 58 (written testimony of Professor Luna).
323. Proponents for the addition of sexual orientation to federal hate crime
legislation have made similar arguments about the problem of under-reporting in the
LGBTQ community. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 31, at 500-01 (discussing various causes
of underreporting including fear of law enforcement and retaliation).
324. See Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at 159-61
(written testimony of David B. Muhlhausen).
325. Id. at 161.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 15. Professor Levin construed the small percentage of the homeless
population differently, concluding that taking into account the "homeless population
[is] less than one percent of the population . .. the [hate crime] numbers are even more
staggering." See id. at 57 (written testimony of Professor Levin).
328. Id. at 163-64.
329. Id. at 163 (written testimony of David B. Muhlhausen).
330. Muhlhausen's position can be contrasted with that of Simone Manning-Moon,
the sister of a homeless man murdered in an apparent hate crime in Georgia. Her
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After the hearing, Senators Tom Coburn (R-OK) and Amy
Klobuchar (D-MN)331 submitted written questions to the panel
members.332 Most of these exchanges revisited a variety of technical
concerns with hate crime laws generally,3s but panelists also
continued to debate specific technical concerns, such as the cost and
feasibility of adding homelessness to the HCSA.334 The exchanges
also resurrected familiar straw-man arguments, suggesting the
addition of numerous other groups that had never appealed to
Congress for protection. For example, Senator Coburn asked, "Why
should the act cover the homeless, but not members of the military,
pregnant women, members of a certain political party, etc.?"335
Opponents seized the opportunity to grease fears of a slippery
slope,336 but proponents urged Congress to stay focused on the
specific proposal at hand: the need to collect federal data on bias-
motivated violence directed at the homeless.337
The hearing appeared to have no impact; Senate Bill 1765 died
in Committee.338 Despite the bill's reintroduction in 2013, Congress
continues to appear largely apathetic to evidence of bias crimes
committed against the homeless.339
testimony challenged any suggestion that her brother, a military veteran, did anything
to justify the savage attack that took his life. See id. at 146-48 (statement of Simone
Manning-Moon).
331. Senator Klobuchar is a member of the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor
Party, an affiliate of the Democratic Party. Aviva Breen, Progressive Minnesota? A
Perspective on Women's Issues in the Legislature, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 397, 400
(2006).
332. See Hearings on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 286, at 24, 27,
36, 38.
333. See, e.g., id. at 30 (statement of Professor Luna) (answering Senator Coburn's
questions about the proper standard of proof "to establish bias sufficient to include an
offense in the federal hate crime statistics"); see also id. at 33 (revisiting general
"policy and constitutional questions" about the HCSA).
334. See, e.g., id. at 32 (conceding that the FBI and other law enforcement panelists
testified that the addition of homelessness would not be burdensome, but countering
"that the simplicity of a classification system and relevant instrument may raise
concerns about the validity of any results").
335. Id. at 36.
336. See, e.g., id. at 36 (statement of David B. Muhlhausen) (asserting that "[t]he
inclusion of the homeless in the HCSA only opens the door wider for advocacy groups
to assert that crimes against other groups need to be added to the HCSA" and then
advocating for coverage of pregnant women, children, and the military); id. at 34
(statement of Professor Luna) (cautioning "there is no logical limit to the number or
types of groups that might be included in a hate crimes statute").
337. For example, Commander Wierzbicki responded to slippery slope arguments
simply and matter-of-factly: "In my 28 years as a law enforcement officer ... I have
not experienced bias motivated hate directed towards the victims of crimes from the
groups you have listed." Id. at 39 (statement of Commander Wierzbicki).
338. See S. 1765, GOVTRACK.US, supra note 285.
339. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
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B. Comparing the Homeless to the Other Covered Groups
Similar to congressional debates over sexual orientation, the
Senate hearing on anti-homeless violence featured all four indicia of
congressional resistance: (1) the apparent requirement of compelling
evidence that the homeless are vulnerable to bias crimes; (2)
rejections of such proffered evidence; (3) expressions of hostility
toward the homeless, including suggestions that the homeless are
criminal, morally inadequate, or otherwise unworthy of protection;
and (4) technical challenges, such as the attacks on the clarity of the
definitional term "homeless" or the feasibility of data collection.340
In another parallel move, advocates for the homeless advanced
the same arguments for inclusion and offered evidence that was
qualitatively comparable341 to that offered by sexual orientation
advocates. This offense included credible evidence of special
vulnerability to violent bias crimes; pervasive evidence of systemic
discrimination and social rejection; and related analogies to currently
covered groups.342
And there are further similarities: the weight of scholarship
establishes that, for purposes of hate crime protection, the homeless
are similarly situated to the other HCSA covered groups.343 If the
340. See generally Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285
(highlighting the issues surrounding protection of the homeless).
341. Both candidate groups offered statistical and anecdotal evidence that was
compelling, but was also subject to acknowledged limitations, many of which were
determined by the limited resources of the proffering advocacy groups. Nonetheless,
both groups' evidence could be considered credible by a pragmatic standard. See
Jenness, supra note 22, at 556 n.6 ("Claims are empirically credible 'to the extent that
there are events and occurrences that can be pointed to as documentary evidence."')
(internal citation omitted).
342. Frederick Lawrence suggests that one application of the second stage is to
make analogical comparisons between the candidate group and the "classic social
fissure lines" of race. LAWRENCE, supra note 2, at 14. Unfortunately, the hearing on
homelessness missed a critical opportunity to analogize the institutionalization of bias
against the homeless: like anti-sodomy laws, laws that criminalize the homeless are
widespread, well-documented, and soundly criticized as violating the constitutional
rights of the homeless. See, e.g., NAT'L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY,
CRIMINALIZING CRISIS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 17
(2011), available at http://www.nlchp.org/CriminalizingCrisis; U.S. INTERAGENCY
COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, SEARCHING OUT SOLUTIONS: CONSTRUCTIVE
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS 2-5 (2012), available at
http://www.usich.gov/resources/uploads/asset-library/RPTSoSMarch2012.pdf.
343. See, e.g., Jeff McDonald, Should "Bum-Bashing" Be a Hate Crime?, 15 PUB.
INT. L. REP. 115, 116-17 (2010); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications,
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135 (2011); Sarah Finnane Hanafin, Legal Shelter: A Case for
Homelessness as a Protected Status Under Hate Crime Law and Enhanced Equal
Protection Scrutiny, 40 STETSON L. REV. 435, 436-37 (2011); Raegan Joern, Note, Mean
Streets: Violence Against the Homeless and the Makings of Hate Crime, 6 HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 305, 306-07 (2009); Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place Is
Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501 (2003).
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homeless are equally deserving of coverage, then there is "no sensible
ground for differential treatment."344 On a comparative basis, the
homeless should be covered under the HCSA. And yet, despite
repeated efforts from homeless advocates over the last four years,
Congress continues to manifest indifference to the problem of bias-
motivated violence against the homeless.
The plight of the homeless is also compounded by a relative lack
of effective organization and power, political representation, and
mainstream visibility. Each of these factors significantly contributed
to the successful effort to add sexual orientation to the HCSA. But
the homeless do not enjoy organizational power comparable to the
formidable coalition that fought for the inclusion of sexual
orientation. Unlike the bid to add sexual orientation, which benefited
from representative political insiders like Representative Barney
Frank (D-MA) and Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI),345 there are no
homeless politicians at any level of government. And unlike the gay
and lesbian community, which capitalized on a growing "six degrees
of separation" phenomenon among the general population in the late
1980s, the homeless remain a shadowy population of strangers to the
vast majority of Americans.346
But if the homeless are similarly situated to the other groups
currently covered under the HCSA, what explains the lack of
congressional response? One explanation rests on the relationship
between apathy and discrimination: prejudice against a particular
group need not always take the form of deliberate and overt
discrimination; prejudice can also be expressed through
indifference.347
Compare Katherine O'Keefe, Protecting the Homeless Under Vulnerable Victim
Sentencing Guidelines: An Alternative to Inclusion in Hate Crime Laws, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 301, 302-05 (2010), with Scott Steiner, Habitations of Cruelty: The
Pitfalls of Expanding Hate Crime Legislation to Include the Homeless, 45 CRIM . L.
BULL. 1 (2009).
344. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
345. See supra note 80.
346. See notes 85, 271, and accompanying text (explaining the phenomenon).
347. See, e.g., In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel File 98-26, 597
N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn. 1999) ("Racism, whether it takes the form of an individual's
overt bigotry or an institution's subtle apathy, is, by its very nature, serious.");
Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth: Family Law, Gender Roles, and Changing
Attitudes Toward Female Victims of Domestic Violence, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6
(2013) (examining the "standard narrative about public responses to domestic violence
[as revealing] a history of apathy and discrimination toward abused women"); Stuart
W. Tisdale, Jr., Reasonable Accommodation and Non-Invidious Discrimination Under
the Maine Human Rights Act, 40 ME. L. REV. 475, 476 (1988) ("[A]ntidiscrimination




IV. PRINCIPLED EXPANSIONS OF FEDERAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION
As shown above, Congress may exclude the homeless-arguably
an otherwise meritorious candidate group-from HCSA coverage.
Such deliberations may be compromised by the lack of transparent
and consistent principles, as well as the influence of unrecognized
bias. In this respect, the legislative omission helps to reify social
group biases because similarly situated groups are not equitably
assessed; instead, legislative protections are filtered through private,
often unrecognized, biases.
As a result, statistics and other evidence of need for hate crime
protection have played an inconsistent role in a candidate group's bid
for coverage under the HCSA. Instead, congressional vetting of
candidate groups appears to correlate with the relative social
acceptability or popularity of the candidate group. Unpopular
candidate groups are more likely to be required to present compelling
evidence of their vulnerability to bias crimes; more likely to
experience rejection or discounting of their proffered data; more
likely to be portrayed as morally repugnant; and more likely to
receive persistent technical objections.
There is no principled basis for such a spike in congressional
scrutiny for socially unpopular groups. But Thomas Birkland
describes a relationship between evidence and "emotion" in
policymaking that may help to explain:
[Olne need not necessarily have all the evidence in hand if one's
argument strikes a chord with the public and decision makers. This
means, more bluntly, that one needs relatively little evidence is
needed to make an argument if it is possible to appeal to popular
prejudices and common misconceptions, or to common values or
interests that are not too far outside the mainstream of current
thought. This sounds cynical, but there are abundant examples in
American history and world history of emotion overcoming
rationality in policy making, such as the imposition of Jim Crow
laws on black Americans based on a scientifically unfounded belief
that blacks are genetically inferior to whites in some way. Because
neither facts nor emotions are solely decisive, evidence and emotion
play important roles in policy making, and sometimes emotion
gains the upper hand.348
If the dominant legislative emotion is antipathy, aroused by the
involuntary traits of a particular group, the attendant deliberations
are likely to be invidious.349 Legislative discrimination becomes
"irrational prejudice"350 because it does not "rest[] on meaningful
348. BIRKLAND, supra note 11, at 17.
349. Legislative discrimination is particularly concerning when it is directed at
status or traits, as opposed to conduct. See Pollvogt, supra note 14, at 904-05.
350. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
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considerations."351 In fact, such prejudice is particularly irrational
when Congress is supposed to be assessing a candidate group's
vulnerability to bias.
Of course, an essential function of Equal Protection
jurisprudence is to root out uneven, arbitrary or unprincipled
application of the laws.352 Although the judiciary is not immune to
bias,353 it is supposed to monitor legislative discrimination through
the enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Equal Protection jurisprudence vets legislative
discrimination against legal principles; that is, courts use stare
decisis, analogical reasoning, and other interpretive norms to ensure
the equitable impact of any legislation.354 In this respect, judicial
review acts as a check on legislative decision-making, intervening
when a law has a prejudicial impact on a certain group or groups. 355
Furthermore, judicial review should help to ensure that the
legislature is not discriminating against "unpopular" groups that
cannot combat such discrimination through means like political
power and representation.356 Ultimately, the imposition of judicial
review means that although the legislature necessarily must
discriminate among various members of society, it may not do so in a
way that offends the Constitution.
Although Equal Protection jurisprudence generally operates to
ensure the legislature is not discriminating against unpopular and
351. Id. at 441.
352. See, e.g., id. at 440 (justifying judicial intervention in the form of strict scrutiny
when a law "reflect[s] prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened
class are not as worthy or deserving as others"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (treating
similarly situated classes differently without a normative justification amounts to the
"very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution]").
353. Indeed, the reviewing role of the judiciary hardly means it is neutral or
immune to discrimination; to the contrary, Equal Protection jurisprudence also
requires courts to walk a similar tightrope. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling
Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 787 (1991) (noting that
judicial distinctions between "justifiable [and] unjustifiable disadvantaging quite
plainly requires a substantive value choice").
354. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959) (noting that, to have any "legal quality," a decision is
"obliged to be ... entirely principled"). See generally Klarman, supra note 353, at 747
(discussing the role of judicial review over legislative decision-making from a
POLITICAL process theory perspective).
355. See Klarman, supra note 353, at 782-88. But of course, judicial review does not
always function as a proper check on legislative discrimination. See generally Nice,
supra note 174 (arguing that both the legislature and the judiciary ignore the
constitutional rights of the poor, resulting in a "dialogic default").
356. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities .... .").
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politically powerless groups, this check does not exist in this case. 357
Instead, in the context of shaping hate crime legislation, it must be
Congress's job to protect the most vulnerable.358 Julie Nice's theory of
"dialogic default" provides a helpful framework for this imperative.359
Nice explains that the judiciary defers to the legislature on matters
of "social or economic legislation"360 because the "Justices presume
any problems will be remedied within the political process."361 But
this deference creates a "dialogic default" because certain vulnerable
groups may "not expect equal constitutional protection from the
judiciary, [and] they also lack the types of resources typically
required for effective political mobilization to pursue protection from
the political branches of government."362 When vulnerable groups
like the homeless enter such a dialogic default, the result is the
"stagnation" of their social and constitutional rights.363
While other candidates can combat congressional resistance by
leveraging organizational and political power, the homeless have no
comparable resources. As a result, the homeless are trapped by
societal prejudice, stymied by congressional apathy, and omitted
from statutory protections against animus-motivated violence-even
though the homeless are similarly situated to other groups currently
covered under the HCSA. As a practical matter then, the lack of
principles (and concurrent lack of accountability) evident in
congressional expansions of the HCSA leaves those that are most
vulnerable to unrecognized bias omitted from statutory protections
against bias-motivated violence. A more consistent, transparent, and
principle-driven process would mitigate the potential impact of
unrecognized bias and consequential dialogic default.364
V. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION FACTORS AS PRINCIPLED CRITERIA
Suspect classification factors are imperfect but essential tools in
357. See, e.g., Nice, supra note 174, at 643-49. The legislative omission of
meritorious groups from hate crime protection is essentially invisible to the judiciary.
Id.
358. See Anti-Gay Violence Hearing, supra note 45, at 8 (statement of Rep. Frank)
("[Tihe role of the Government ought to be to protect minorities who are made
vulnerable because of prejudice, whatever the source.").
359. See Nice, supra note 174, at 657-63. Professor Nice's thesis focuses on the poor
in particular; however, the theory applies equally as well to the homeless. Id. at 629-
36.
360. Id. at 638-44.
361. Id. at 631 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 662-63.
364. A comprehensive evaluation of the viability of suspect classification factors for
congressional use is beyond the scope of this Article; instead, this Article introduces
the proposal, which is more fully developed in Rankin, supra note 45.
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Equal Protection jurisprudence. At the moment, these factors only
come into play after a law is passed and is challenged as offensive to
the Equal Protection Clause; in other words, suspect classification
analysis is commonly understood as a judicial, reactive process.36 5
Congress is not required to use suspect classification factors to
determine which groups to include under federal hate crime
legislation.366 But this article suggests that at least some suspect
classification factors should function proactively on the legislative
decisions with respect to expansions the HCSA.367
Although the consistent use of any equitable criteria could
represent an improvement over the status quo, suspect classification
factors may be a natural source of principled guidance for at least
three reasons: (1) they are legal constructs for measuring the degree
to which bias or prejudice against a certain group is a recognizable
social pathology; (2) a broad range of legal scholarship implicitly
adopts suspect classification factors to advocate for the inclusion or
exclusion of candidate groups under hate crime legislation; and (3)
Congress appears to subconsciously consult some of these factors,
albeit inconsistently.
Suspect classification factors generally include inquiries into
whether the candidate group (1) shares a coherent group identity; (2)
has suffered historical discrimination, (3) is unable to protect itself in
the political process, (4) is defined by a trait that is immutable or
difficult to change; and (5) shares a defining trait that is relevant to
an individual's ability to function or contribute to society.368 Legal
365. Julius Cohen, Legisprudence: Problems and Agenda, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1163,
1165-66 (1983).
366. Indeed, Justice Scalia's passionate dissent in Romer suggested that Congress
can and should send a message of social rejection to certain groups that might
undermine "traditional ... mores." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia
J., dissenting) (arguing that Colorado's proposition to repeal all laws and policies
protecting homosexuals from discrimination served a legitimate purpose: "to preserve
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise
those mores through use of the laws"). Justice Scalia's position, which he based in part
on the subsequently overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), has been
soundly criticized by scholars as morally and doctrinally wrong. See, e.g., Joseph S.
Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection,
45 UCLA L. REV. 453, 469-71 (1997) (stating that Justice Scalia's "rhetoric cannot
withstand analysis"); Pollvogt, supra note 14, at 914-15 (arguing that Justice Scalia's
reliance on Bowers was misplaced after the Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas).
367. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012).
368. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-47 (using
factors to determine whether cognitively disabled persons are a suspect class); Mass.
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (using factors to determine
whether the elderly are a suspect class); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87
(1973) (using factors to determine whether women are a suspect class). To date, the
Court has applied heightened scrutiny when governments discriminate based on race,
gender, illegitimacy, alienage, and national origin. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 629; Clark
v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
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scholars increasingly engage suspect classification standards in
debates over whether a candidate group should be covered under
hate crime legislation, although none explain how or why it is
appropriate to graft these judicially-created and retroactively applied
factors to the legislative decision-making process.36 9 Congressional
records also occasionally invoke some of these factors, especially a
factor that is properly at the heart of anti-bias inquiries: evidence of
discrimination against a candidate group.370 At times, Congress could
also be construed as flirting with immutability,371 political
powerlessness,372 positive traits,373 and even group coherence,374 but
such exchanges are fleeting and often misdirected.375 If these factors
are clarified for congressional use, 376 deliberations over expansions of
the HCSA could become more equitable, consistent, and transparent.
(1976). Classifications based on religion also warrant heightened scrutiny, but this
review is separately warranted by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004). On the other hand, the Court
has declined such scrutiny for classifications based on mental disability, Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 443; age, Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313; wealth, Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635
(1986); and close family relationship, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
369. See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 2, at 12-14 (stressing the need to analyze
group identity and history of discrimination); Grattet & Jenness, Criminology, supra
note 8 (applying same factors); Hanafin, supra note 344 (applying group identity and
immutability); O'Keefe, supra note 344 (considering immutability and "equal
applicability"); Steiner, supra note 344 (applying group identity, immutability, and
"equal applicability"); Watson, supra note 344 (applying evidence of a "discrete and
insular minority," historical discrimination, political powerlessness, "irrelevance," and
immutability); Joern, supra note 343 (emphasizing group identity, evidence of
legislative discrimination).
370. The problem, as suggested throughout this Article, is that Congress does not
consistently require or scrutinize a statistical record. When Congress does not evenly
apply standards for "acceptable" statistical proof, then the potential for invidious
discrimination increases. When Congress ratchets up the evidentiary requirements
only for unpopular groups, it ironically suggests discrimination against these groups.
To minimize the potential impact of legislative bias, Congress needs to identify
principled criteria and to consistently and equitably apply these criteria to all
candidate groups.
371. See, e.g., Hearing on Crimes Against America's Homeless, supra note 285, at 61
(written testimony of Professor Levin) (critiquing immutability).
372. See, e.g., supra pp. 573-75 (discussing the political power of gays and lesbians).
373. See, e.g., supra pp. 579-81 (debating whether homosexuality has a positive or
negative influence on society).
374. Because debates over the breadth of statutory definitions relate to whether and
how members of the candidate group can be identified, these debates express concerns
with group coherence. See, e.g., supra notes 67-69, 114-15 and accompanying text.
375. For example, in debates over the addition of sexual orientation, opposing
conservatives discussed their views on the political power and positive traits of gays
and lesbians, but this rhetoric was frequently homophobic and not emblematic of the
equal protection concern with protecting vulnerable groups from legislative
discrimination.
376. See Rankin, supra note 45.
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But further analysis is necessary: although some suspect
classification factors seem particularly salutary for legislative
purposes, some suspect classification factors appear less appropriate.
For example, immutability has been soundly criticized by legal
scholars and the United States Supreme Court.377 One pointed
critique is illustrative:
The list of complaints with the immutability factor's role . . . for
Equal Protection purposes continues to grow, and the list of
defenders of immutability as a useful doctrinal tool has nearly
shrunk to zero . . . . Indeed, they claim, it has no real relationship
with the true organizing principle of the Equal Protection Clause-
to protect precariously positioned minorities from failures of the
democratic process. 378
Such resounding critiques suggest that the simple importation of
immutability into legislative assessments of HCSA candidate groups
would be at best unhelpful and perhaps harmful to the interest in
protecting vulnerable groups. 379
Another factor that warrants caution before encouraging its
deployment in congressional deliberations is the positive trait factor.
Positive trait analysis measures whether members of a group are
generally compromised in their ability to contribute to society.3s0
Although this factor is generally accepted for purposes of judicial
review,381 it may not be an appropriate legislative filter to admit or
exclude candidate groups from hate crime protections. This caution is
evident in legislative history, which as proven above, demonstrates a
tendency to construe unpopular groups as having limited or
deleterious effects on society. Therefore, the positive trait inquiry
377. The Court has expressly rejected the proposition that alienage classifications
should not be subject to strict scrutiny because "a resident alien can voluntarily
withdraw from favored status." Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1977). But see
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 n.10 ("[T]here's not much left of the immutability theory, is
there?" (quoting ELY, supra note 4, at 150)). Similarly, judges have noted the
mutability of the defining traits of each suspect class. See Kim, supra note 31, at 517
("[T]here are operations to change one's gender, one can take medicines to change skin
tone, and aliens can become naturalized." (citing Watkins v. Army, 875 F.2d 699,726
(9th Cir. 1989))).
378. Michael A. Helfand, The Usual Suspect Classifications: Criminals, Aliens, and
the Future of Same Sex Marriage, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (2009).
379. If immutability has any relevance to congressional deliberations over hate
crime laws, it must be re-examined for consistency with this particular context. See id.
at 8-9 (discussing the "significance of ... context-sensitivity" in judicial importations of
the immutability factor).
380. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-44 (determining the trait of cognitive
disability could limit one's ability to function in society and could therefore be a valid
basis for legislative classifications).
381. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 342, at 165-67 (discussing judicial consideration
of a group's defining trait in relation to the relevancy of that trait to the ability to
"participate and contribute to society").
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may be too easily hijacked to justify exclusion of unpopular groups
from hate crime protections-even if the group provides credible
evidence of vulnerability to violent hate crimes. Moreover, the
"positive trait" inquiry appears to have no relevance to the narrow
inquiry of hate crime law development: is this group's defining trait
the focus of animus-based, violent crime? The positive trait factor
unnecessarily broadens the focus of this inquiry, and invites reliance
on stereotypes and prejudices as opposed to careful and equitable
legislative judgment. Therefore, the positive trait factor does not
seem appropriate for grafting onto congressional assessments of
HCSA candidate groups. 382
Although undeniably imperfect,383 suspect classification factors
can at least provide some grounding for the development of more
equitable hate crime legislation. Indeed, the adoption of any more
consistent and principled criteria might be an improvement, but the
problem of congressional bias in federal hate crime legislation should
not be considered lightly: the fate of some vulnerable groups hangs in
the balance. Ultimately, the fate of these groups will depend on
whether Congress can be persuaded to equitably assess them for
coverage under the HCSA.
CONCLUSION
There is prejudice abroad in the land. By ignoring it, we silently
condone it. By documenting its existence, incident by incident, we
are forced to face its reality, whereby we begin to find a solution.384
How can we understand congressional decisions as to which
groups to include or exclude under federal hate crime legislation? To
a large extent, the answer depends on whether the review is
descriptive (that is, describing the way things are) or normative
(describing the way things should be). Acknowledging that the
legislative process can be volatile and complex is certainly a realistic
description of the status quo,3s5 but resignation to unprincipled
"politics" does nothing to advance the discussion of what legislative
decision-making sometimes can be and more often should be.386
382. If the positive trait factor were to play any helpful role in congressional
decision-making, it should be understood more broadly as a focus on status, not
conduct. See Pollvogt, supra note 14, at 904-05 (discussing this distinction in Supreme
Court precedent).
383. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 342, at 141 (discussing "the inconsistencies and
absurdities" of suspect classification tests). Moreover, suspect classification analyses
have been blasted as poorly designed, and haphazardly created. See, e.g., id. at 147.
384. 135 CONG. REc.3179, 3182 (1989) (statement of Rep. Barbara Kennelly).
385. See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 425 (1994) (applying chaos theory to legislative process);
Jenness, supra note 22, at 549 (describing legislative decision-making with respect to
federal hate crimes as a "fundamentally political process").
386. The late Professor Julius Cohen acknowledged the political and often
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INVIDIOUS DELIBERATION
Simply accepting legislative decision-making as unprincipled also
ignores observations that legislative decision-making can be more
principled despite political turbulence.387 Moreover, the
unpredictable storm of politics certainly impacts judicial decision-
making,388 but such pressures have never been accepted as the most
desirable methodological practice for court decisions.
Congress should improve the principled quality of its
assessments of HCSA candidate groups. This imperative stems not
only from a basic call for fairness, but it also becomes even more
poignant in the process of crafting anti-bias legislation. Congress can
mitigate the potential impact of unrecognized bias by using more
consistent and transparent criteria to decide group coverage under
the HCSA. Such criteria will help to develop congressional awareness
and accountability; it will also help to discourage legislators from
relying on stereotypes or prejudice to justify the omission of an
otherwise meritorious candidate group from coverage under the
HCSA.
If Congress is not so persuaded, vulnerable groups like the
homeless will remain invisible: stuck in a dialogic default where the
legislature does not feel compelled to protect them by affording
statutory protection from violent bias-motivated crimes, and the
judiciary will not review such legislative omissions for evidence of
inequities or prejudice. As a result, those that are most vulnerable to
unrecognized bias will remain subject to the legislative whim that
now decides whether a candidate group really is subject to
discrimination.
unprincipled nature of legislative process, but argued:
This discouraging picture is not designed to suggest that improvements
cannot possibly be made, and that efforts by theorists in legisprudence to
minimize vagueness and ambiguity in legislative language should therefore
be abandoned. To the contrary, such theorists must recognize and directly
confront the problems that are involved, with full awareness that the odds
are stacked against reaching Nirvana. One should not, in the language of
Tourtoulon, "throw to the dogs all that is not fit for the altar of the gods."
Cohen, supra note 365, at 1172 (quoting P. DE TOURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 348 (Ass'n of Am. L. Sch. ed. 1922)).
387. See generally id. But see Di Lorenzo, supra note 385, at 429 (arguing there are
positive functions to "the unpredictable nature of legislative action").
388. See Cohen, supra note 365, at 1166.
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